Related papers: Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
Facility location is fundamental in operations research, mechanism design, and algorithmic game theory, with applications ranging from urban infrastructure planning to distributed systems. Recent research in this area has focused on…
This paper is part of an emerging line of work at the intersection of machine learning and mechanism design, which aims to avoid noise in training data by correctly aligning the incentives of data sources. Specifically, we focus on the…
We study three axioms in the model of constrained social choice under uncertainty where (i) agents have subjective expected utility preferences over acts and (ii) different states of nature have (possibly) different sets of available…
In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…
We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be…
A designer offers vertically-differentiated positions to agents in the absence of transfers. Agents have private outside options and may reject their offers ex-post. The designer has preferences over the quantity of agents who accept each…
Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We study the problem of designing replication-proof bandit mechanisms when agents strategically register or replicate their own arms to maximize their payoff. Specifically, we consider Bayesian agents who only know the distribution from…
The purpose of this note is to prove the existence of a randomized mechanism, a social decision scheme (SDS), with desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness properties unmatched by all known SDSs. In particular, we disprove a…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
Severe impossibility results restrict the design of strategyproof random assignment mechanisms, and trade-offs are necessary when aiming for more demanding efficiency requirements, such as ordinal or rank efficiency. We introduce hybrid…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
A set of agents has to make a decision about the provision of a public good and its financing. Agents have heterogeneous values for the public good and each agent's value is private information. An agenda-setter has the right to make a…
Algorithms are often used to produce decision-making rules that classify or evaluate individuals. When these individuals have incentives to be classified a certain way, they may behave strategically to influence their outcomes. We develop a…
We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of…
System correctness is one of the most crucial and challenging objectives in software and hardware systems. With the increasing evolution of connected and distributed systems, ensuring their correctness requires the use of formal…
We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n…
This paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over agent strategies. Unlike previous work on alternating temporal epistemic logic, the semantics works with systems whose states explicitly encode…