Related papers: Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in reward allocation is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where…
In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
Federations among sets of Cloud Providers (CPs), whereby a set of CPs agree to mutually use their own resources to run the VMs of other CPs, are considered a promising solution to the problem of reducing the energy cost. In this paper, we…
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…
The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…
Collaborative spectrum sensing among secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks is shown to yield a significant performance improvement. However, there exists an inherent trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
High performance machine learning models have become highly dependent on the availability of large quantity and quality of training data. To achieve this, various central agencies such as the government have suggested for different data…
Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…
Mobile edge computing seeks to provide resources to different delay-sensitive applications. This is a challenging problem as an edge cloud-service provider may not have sufficient resources to satisfy all resource requests. Furthermore,…
We propose a class of cooperative games, called d Partitioned Compbinatorial Optimization Games (PCOGs). The input of PCOG consists of a set of agents and a combinatorial structure (typically a graph) with a fixed optimization goal on this…
Sharing economy has become a socio-economic trend in transportation and housing sectors. It develops business models leveraging underutilized resources. Like those sectors, power grid is also becoming smarter with many flexible resources,…
We study coalitional games with exogenous uncertainty in the coalition value, in which each agent is allowed to have private samples of the uncertainty. As a consequence, the agents may have a different perception of stability of the grand…
In many multiagent scenarios, agents distribute resources, such as time or energy, among several tasks. Having completed their tasks and generated profits, task payoffs must be divided among the agents in some reasonable manner. Cooperative…
The use of game theory in the design and control of large scale networked systems is becoming increasingly more important. In this paper, we follow this approach to efficiently solve a network allocation problem motivated by peer-to- peer…