Related papers: Primal-dual evolutionary dynamics for constrained …
We study the connection between the evolutionary replicator dynamics and the number of Nash equilibria in large random bi-matrix games. Using techniques of disordered systems theory we compute the statistical properties of both, the fixed…
Complex networks serve as abstract models for understanding real-world complex systems and provide frameworks for studying structured dynamical systems. This article addresses limitations in current studies on the exploration of individual…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
This study addresses primal-dual dynamics for a stochastic programming problem for capacity network design. It is proven that consensus can be achieved on the \textit{here and now} variables which represent the capacity of the network. The…
This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2-strategy games. We…
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…
In this paper, we formulate an evolutionarymultiple access control game with continuousvariable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient…
In this paper, we discover that the class of random polynomials arising from the equilibrium analysis of random asymmetric evolutionary games is \textit{exactly} the Kostlan-Shub-Smale system of random polynomials, revealing an intriguing…
Evolutionary game theory is used to model the evolution of competing strategies in a population of players. Evolutionary stability of a strategy is a dynamic equilibrium, in which any competing mutated strategy would be wiped out from a…
We study the asymptotic behavior of deterministic, continuous-time imitation dynamics for population games over networks. The basic assumption of this learning mechanism -- encompassing the replicator dynamics -- is that players belonging…
Population protocols have been introduced by Angluin et {al.} as a model of networks consisting of very limited mobile agents that interact in pairs but with no control over their own movement. A collection of anonymous agents, modeled by…
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…
This paper deals with modeling of network's dynamic using evolutionary games approach. Today there are many different protocols for data transmission through the Internet, providing users with better or worse service. The process of…
The minimum-effort coordination game, having potentially important implications in both evolutionary biology and sociology, draws recently more attention for the fact that human behavior in this social dilemma is often inconsistent with the…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
This paper introduces a hierarchical framework for population games, where individuals delegate decision-making to proxies that act within their own strategic interests. This framework extends classical population games, where individuals…
Population games model the evolution of strategic interactions among a large number of uniform agents. Due to the agents' uniformity and quantity, their aggregate strategic choices can be approximated by the solutions of a class of ordinary…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two…
Evolutionary dynamics can be studied in well-mixed or structured populations. Population structure typically arises from the heterogeneous distribution of individuals in physical space or on social networks. Here we introduce a new type of…