Related papers: Primal-dual evolutionary dynamics for constrained …
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical…
We show that evolutionarily stable states in general (nonlinear) population games (which can be viewed as continuous vector fields constrained on a polytope) are asymptotically stable under a multiplicative weights dynamic (under…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
An universal primal-dual approach of description equilibriums in large class of hierarchical congestion population games is proposed. At the very core of the approach is hierarchy of enclosed to each other transport networks. In different…
We consider a class of fully stochastic and fully distributed algorithms, that we prove to learn equilibria in games. Indeed, we consider a family of stochastic distributed dynamics that we prove to converge weakly (in the sense of weak…
This brief discusses evolutionary game theory as a powerful and unified mathematical tool to study evolution of collective behaviours. It summarises some of my recent research directions using evolutionary game theory methods, which include…
We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…
Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…
Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay…
To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…
Evolutionary game theory has been a successful tool to combine classical game theory with learning-dynamical descriptions in multiagent systems. Provided some symmetric structures of interacting players, many studies have been focused on…
We propose a new evolutionary dynamics for population games with a discrete strategy set, inspired by the theory of optimal transport and Mean field games. The dynamics can be described as a Fokker-Planck equation on a discrete strategy…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
This tutorial article puts forth a framework to analyze the noncooperative strategic interactions among the members of a large population of bounded rationality agents. Our approach hinges on, unifies and generalizes existing methods and…
We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dynamics to study multipopulation dynamics on the simplex equipped with a large class of Riemmanian metrics, simultaneously generalizing and extending many dynamics commonly studied in dynamic…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes the spreading of successful strategies in a population of reproducing individuals. Typically, the microscopic definition of strategy spreading is stochastic, such that the dynamics becomes deterministic…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…