Related papers: Competing Persuaders in Zero-Sum Games

We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…

In repeated games, cooperation is possible in equilibrium only if players are sufficiently patient, and long-term gains from cooperation outweigh short-term gains from deviation. What happens if the players have incomplete information…

This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…

A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…

We propose a model of causal persuasion, in which a sender selectively discloses a set of variables together with their true joint distribution and proposes a subjective causal model that binds them. A receiver is persuaded by this model…

We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…

We consider a two-player dynamic information design problem between a principal and a receiver -- a game is played between the two agents on top of a Markovian system controlled by the receiver's actions, where the principal obtains and…

I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…

We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…

When people choose what messages to send to others, they often consider how others will interpret the messages. A sender may expect a receiver to engage in motivated reasoning, leading the receiver to trust good news more than bad news,…

We study the bounds of mediated communication in sender-receiver games in which the sender's payoff is state-independent. We show that the feasible distributions over the receiver's beliefs under mediation are those that induce zero…

Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante…

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility.…

We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We…

This paper studies Bayesian games with general action spaces, correlated types and interdependent payoffs. We introduce the condition of ``decomposable coarser payoff-relevant information'', and show that this condition is both sufficient…

In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…

Competition among news sources may encourage some sources to share fake news and misinformation to influence the public. While sharing misinformation may lead to a short-term gain in audience engagement, it may damage the reputation of…

Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General Lotto games, a class of two-player competitive resource allocation models. We consider…

This work investigates a dynamic variant of Bayesian persuasion, in which a strategic sender seeks to influence a receiver's belief over time through controlling the timing of the information disclosure, under resource constraints. We…

Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…