Related papers: Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Stru…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
A decision problem is called parameterized if its input is a pair of strings. One of these strings is referred to as a parameter. The problem: given a propositional logic program P and a non-negative integer k, decide whether P has a stable…
In this paper, we construct and compare algorithmic approaches to solve the Preference Consistency Problem for preference statements based on hierarchical models. Instances of this problem contain a set of preference statements that are…
In the Stable Marriage problem. when the preference lists are complete, all agents of the smaller side can be matched. However, this need not be true when preference lists are incomplete. In most real-life situations, where agents…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
We investigate the complexity of solving stable or perturbation-resilient instances of $k$-Means and $k$-Median clustering in fixed dimension Euclidean metrics (more generally doubling metrics). The notion of stable (perturbation resilient)…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
Focusing on the bipartite Stable Marriage problem, we investigate different robustness measures related to stable matchings. We analyze the computational complexity of computing them and analyze their behavior in extensive experiments on…
In this paper, we demonstrate that in many NP-complete variants of the stable matching problem, such as the Stable Hypergraph Matching problem, the Stable Multicommodity Flow problem, and the College Admission problem with common quotas, a…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
While the existence of a stable matching for the stable roommates problem possibly with incomplete preference lists (SRI) can be decided in polynomial time, SRI problems with some fairness criteria are intractable. Egalitarian SRI that…
Matrices satisfying the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) play an important role in the areas of compressed sensing and statistical learning. RIP matrices with optimal parameters are mainly obtained via probabilistic arguments, as explicit…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…