Related papers: Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections
For certain weak versions of the Axiom of Choice (most notably, the Boolean Prime Ideal theorem), we obtain equivalent formulations in terms of partial orders, and filter-like objects within them intersecting certain dense sets or…
Justified representation (JR) and extended justified representation (EJR) are well-established proportionality axioms in approval-based multiwinner voting. Both axioms are always satisfiable, but they rely on a fixed quota (typically Hare…
The challenge of understanding the collective behaviors of social systems can benefit from methods and concepts from physics [1-6], not because humans are similar to electrons, but because certain large-scale behaviors can be understood…
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…
A critical issue for society today is the emergence and decline of democracy worldwide. It is unclear, however, how democratic features, such as elections and civil liberties, influence this change. Democracy indices, which are the standard…
In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules, called self-equivalence, by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself will choose not to do so. I then show that under the…
We present a general theorem for distributed synthesis problems in coordination games with $\omega$-regular objectives of the form: If there exists a winning strategy for the coalition, then there exists an "essential" winning strategy,…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…
When comparing performance (of products, services, entities, etc.), multiple attributes are involved. This paper deals with a way of weighting these attributes when one is seeking an overall score. It presents an objective approach to…
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial…
The probability of a given candidate winning a future election is worked out in closed form as a function of (i) the current support rates for each candidate, (ii) the relative positioning of the candidates within the political spectrum,…
This paper introduces a novel binary stability property for voting rules-called binary self-selectivity-by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule using itself in pairwise elections will choose not to do so. In…
The Multinomial Logit (MNL) model and the axiom it satisfies, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), are together the most widely used tools of discrete choice. The MNL model serves as the workhorse model for a variety of…
The Possible Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can become a winner by suitably extending all the votes. Betzler and Dorn [1]…
In this paper we introduce the inaccessible game, an information-theoretic dynamical system constructed from four axioms. The first three axioms are known and define \emph{information loss} in the system. The fourth is a novel…
Direct democracy is a special case of an ensemble of classifiers, where every person (classifier) votes on every issue. This fails when the average voter competence (classifier accuracy) falls below 50%, which can happen in noisy settings…
In multiwinner approval voting, the goal is to select $k$-member committees based on voters' approval ballots. A well-studied concept of proportionality in this context is the justified representation (JR) axiom, which demands that no large…
We investigate the problem of computing the probability of winning in an election where voter attendance is uncertain. More precisely, we study the setting where, in addition to a total ordering of the candidates, each voter is associated…
In this paper, we provide theoretical and empirical estimates for the likelihood of a negative participation paradox under instant runoff voting in three-candidate elections. We determine the probability of the paradox and related…
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the committee. Monotonicity…