Related papers: Variance Contracts
This paper studies an optimal insurance contracting problem in which the preferences of the decision maker given by the sum of the expected loss and a convex, increasing function of a deviation measure. As for the deviation measure, our…
This paper investigates a Pareto optimal insurance problem, where the insured maximizes her rank-dependent utility preference and the insurer is risk neutral and employs the mean-variance premium principle. To eliminate potential moral…
This paper studies optimal insurance design under asymmetric information in a Stackelberg framework, where a monopolistic insurer faces uncertainty about both the insured's risk attitude, captured by a risk-aversion parameter, and the…
I analyze long-term contracting in insurance markets with asymmetric information. The buyer privately observes her risk type, which evolves stochastically over time. A long-term contract specifies a menu of insurance policies, contingent on…
De Finetti's optimal reinsurance is a set of contracts, one for each risk in a portfolio, that caps the retained aggregate variance to a pre-specified level while minimizing total expected loss. The premiums are determined using the…
It is well-known that Excess-of-Loss reinsurance has more marketability than Stop-Loss reinsurance, though Stop-Loss reinsurance is the most prominent setting discussed in the optimal (re)insurance design literature. We point out that…
Optimal reinsurance when Value at Risk and expected surplus is balanced through their ratio is studied, and it is demonstrated how results for risk-adjusted surplus can be utilized. Simplifications for large portfolios are derived, and this…
This paper analyzes optimal insurance design when the insurer internalizes the effect of coverage on third-party service prices. A monopolistic insurer contracts with risk-averse agents who have sequential two-dimensional private…
We study an optimal reinsurance problem under a diffusion risk model for an insurer who aims to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin. To rule out moral hazard issues, we only consider moral-hazard-free reinsurance contracts by imposing…
We consider a monopoly insurance market with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing insurer and a consumer with Yaari Dual Utility preferences that distort the given continuous loss distribution. The insurer observes the loss distribution but not…
In high-risk environments, traditional indemnity insurance is often unaffordable or ineffective, despite its well-known optimality under expected utility. We compare excess-of-loss indemnity insurance with parametric insurance within a…
We design the insurance contract when the insurer faces arson-type risks. The optimal contract must be manipulation-proof. It is therefore continuous, it has a bounded slope, and it satisfies the no-sabotage condition when arson-type…
We find the optimal indemnity to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth of a buyer of insurance whose preferences are modeled by an exponential utility. The insurance premium is computed by a convex functional. We obtain a…
In this article, we employ a principal-agent model to analyze optimal contract design in a monopolistic reinsurance market under adverse selection with a continuum of insurer types. Instead of using the classical expected utility framework,…
We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the…
Bernard et al. (2015) study an optimal insurance design problem where an individual's preference is of the rank-dependent utility (RDU) type, and show that in general an optimal contract covers both large and small losses. However, their…
We find the optimal indemnity to minimize the probability of ruin when premium is calculated according to the distortion premium principle with a proportional risk load, and admissible indemnities are such that both the indemnity and…
This paper investigates Pareto optimal (PO, for short) insurance contracts in a behavioral finance framework, in which the insured evaluates contracts by the rank-dependent utility (RDU) theory and the insurer by the expected value premium…
The increasing penetration of renewable energy poses significant challenges to power grid reliability. There have been increasing interests in utilizing financial tools, such as insurance, to help end-users hedge the potential risk of lost…
This paper explores optimal insurance solutions based on the Lambda-Value-at-Risk ($\Lambda\VaR$). If the expected value premium principle is used, our findings confirm that, similar to the VaR model, a truncated stop-loss indemnity is…