Related papers: On seat allocation problem with multiple merit lis…
Until 2014, admissions to the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) were conducted under one umbrella, whereas the admissions to the non-IIT Centrally Funded Government Institutes (CFTIs) were conducted under a different umbrella, the…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
We propose a mechanism to allocate slots fairly at congested airports. This mechanism: (a) ensures that the slots are allocated according to the true valuations of airlines, (b) provides fair opportunities to the flights connecting remote…
In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…
Peer-to-peer ride-sharing platforms like Uber, Lyft, and DiDi have revolutionized the transportation industry and labor market. At its essence, these systems tackle the bipartite matching problem between two populations: riders and drivers.…
Thick two-sided matching platforms, such as the room-rental market, face the challenge of showing relevant objects to users to reduce search costs. Many platforms use ranking algorithms to determine the order in which alternatives are shown…
A generalization of the heapsort algorithm is proposed. At the expense of about 50% more comparison and move operations for typical cases, the dualheap sort algorithm offers several advantages over heapsort: improved cache performance,…
We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature, we aim to provide fairness not only to participants, but…
Students' decisions on whether to take a class are strongly affected by whether their friends plan to take the class with them. A student may prefer to be assigned to a course they likes less, just to be with their friends, rather than…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
We study stable allocations in college admissions markets where students can attend the same college under different financial terms. The deferred acceptance algorithm identifies a stable allocation where funding is allocated based on…
We study the problem of executing an application represented by a precedence task graph on a parallel machine composed of standard computing cores and accelerators. Contrary to most existing approaches, we distinguish the allocation and the…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
In an era of increasingly capable foundation models, job seekers are turning to generative AI tools to enhance their application materials. However, unequal access to and knowledge about generative AI tools can harm both employers and…
School choice is the two-sided matching market where students (on one side) are to be matched with schools (on the other side) based on their mutual preferences. The classical algorithm to solve this problem is the celebrated deferred…
We study the problem of selecting the top-k candidates from a pool of applicants, where each candidate is associated with a score indicating his/her aptitude. Depending on the specific scenario, such as job search or college admissions,…
This paper considers the problem of scheduling jobs on single and parallel machines where all the jobs possess different processing times but a common due date. There is a penalty involved with each job if it is processed earlier or later…
We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a…