Related papers: Stable Community Structures and Social Exclusion
We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price impacts. Moreover,…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
The common sense suggests that networks are not random mazes of purposeless connections, but that these connections are organised so that networks can perform their functions well. One function common to many networks is targeted transport…
Uni-directional social interactions are ubiquitous in real social networks whereas undirected interactions are intensively studied. We establish a voter model in a dynamical directed network. We analytically obtain the degree distribution…
We investigate the dynamics of Q-learning in a class of generalized Braess paradox games. These games represent an important class of network routing games where the associated stage-game Nash equilibria do not constitute social optima. We…
We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash…
With respect to probabilistic mixtures of the strategies in non-cooperative games, quantum game theory provides guarantee of fixed-point stability, the so-called Nash equilibrium. This permits players to choose mixed quantum strategies that…
In this paper, we address the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. We propose a distributed algorithm, where each agent refines its strategy through projected-gradient…
A classic measure of ecological stability describes the tendency of a community to return to equilibrium after small perturbation. While many advances show how the network structure of these communities severely constrains such tendencies,…
Structural balance theory predicts that triads in networks gravitate towards stable configurations. The theory has been verified for undirected graphs. Since real-world networks are often directed, we introduce a novel method for…
A fundamental problem in noncooperative dynamic game theory is the computation of Nash equilibria under different information structures, which specify the information available to each agent during decision-making. Prior work has…
A robust game is a distribution-free model to handle ambiguity generated by a bounded set of possible realizations of the values of players' payoff functions. The players are worst-case optimizers and a solution, called robust-optimization…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…