Related papers: Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
We study games in which a leader makes a single commitment, and then multiple followers (each with a different utility function) respond. In particular, we study ambiguous commitment strategies in these games, in which the leader may commit…
In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
Game-theoretic inverse learning is the problem of inferring a player's objectives from their actions. We formulate an inverse learning problem in a Stackelberg game between a leader and a follower, where each player's action is the…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
We propose a generalization of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) built on a simple premise: some actions are more focal than others. In our model, which we call the Focal Quantal Response Equilibrium (Focal QRE), each player plays a…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
The behaviour of multi-agent learning in many player games has been shown to display complex dynamics outside of restrictive examples such as network zero-sum games. In addition, it has been shown that convergent behaviour is less likely to…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…
What is the emergent long-run equilibrium of a society where many interacting agents bet on the optimal energy to put in place in order to climb on the Bandwagon? In this paper we study the collective behavior of a large population of…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…