Related papers: Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning and Search f…
Current approximate Coarse Correlated Equilibria (CCE) algorithms struggle with equilibrium approximation for games in large stochastic environments but are theoretically guaranteed to converge to a strong solution concept. In contrast,…
From the very dawn of the field, search with value functions was a fundamental concept of computer games research. Turing's chess algorithm from 1950 was able to think two moves ahead, and Shannon's work on chess from $1950$ includes an…
Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…
Imperfect recall games represent dynamic interactions where players forget previously known information, such as a history of played actions. The importance of imperfect recall games stems from allowing a concise representation of…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
Games, in their mathematical sense, are everywhere (game industries, economics, defense, education, chemistry, biology, ...).Search algorithms in games are artificial intelligence methods for playing such games. Unfortunately, there is no…
Many alignment methods, including reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), rely on the Bradley-Terry reward assumption, which is not always sufficient to capture the full range and complexity of general human preferences. We…
This paper addresses the problem of learning an equilibrium efficiently in general-sum Markov games through decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the fundamental difficulty of calculating a Nash equilibrium (NE), we…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization and variants (e.g. Public Chance Sampling CFR and Pure CFR) have been known as the best approaches for creating approximate Nash equilibrium solutions for imperfect information games such as poker. This…
Zero-sum games have long guided artificial intelligence research, since they possess both a rich strategy space of best-responses and a clear evaluation metric. What's more, competition is a vital mechanism in many real-world multi-agent…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
In this paper, we consider a distributed Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) seeking problem in incomplete-information aggregative games, which is a generalization of Bayesian games and deterministic aggregative games. We handle the aggregation…
Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…
We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only…
In this paper, the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problem for continuous games with coupled affine inequality constraints is investigated in a partial-decision information scenario, where each player can only access its…
In recent years, much progress has been made in computer Go and most of the results have been obtained thanks to search algorithms (Monte Carlo Tree Search) and Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL). In this paper, we propose to use and analyze…
Dominance is a fundamental concept in game theory. In normal-form games dominated strategies can be identified in polynomial time. As a consequence, iterative removal of dominated strategies can be performed efficiently as a preprocessing…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
Self-play is a technique for machine learning in multi-agent systems where a learning algorithm learns by interacting with copies of itself. Self-play is useful for generating large quantities of data for learning, but has the drawback that…
We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…