Related papers: Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communicati…

We study the problem of inferring communication structures that can solve cooperative multi-agent planning problems while minimizing the amount of communication. We quantify the amount of communication as the maximum degree of the…

We consider a cooperative multi-agent system consisting of a team of agents with decentralized information. Our focus is on the design of symmetric (i.e. identical) strategies for the agents in order to optimize a finite horizon team…

We investigate the algorithmic problem of selling information to agents who face a decision-making problem under uncertainty. We adopt the model recently proposed by Bergemann et al. [BBS18], in which information is revealed through…

We focus on the following natural question: is it possible to influence the outcome of a voting process through the strategic provision of information to voters who update their beliefs rationally? We investigate whether it is…

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally…

We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…

We study a regularized variant of the Bayesian Persuasion problem, where the receiver's decision process includes a divergence-based penalty that accounts for deviations from perfect rationality. This modification smooths the underlying…

When multiple informative equilibria are possible in a general cheap talk game, how much information can a principal guarantee herself? To answer this question, I define the notion of worst-case implementation-implementation via the worst…

In the classical Bayesian persuasion model an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. The informed player, the sender, knows the state of nature, while the uninformed one, the receiver, does not. The informed…

In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach to the receiver's problem. A signal is optimal iff the…

Bayesian models of group learning are studied in Economics since the 1970s. and more recently in computational linguistics. The models from Economics postulate that agents maximize utility in their communication and actions. The Economics…

This paper considers a distributed optimization problem in a multi-agent system where a fraction of the agents act in an adversarial manner. Specifically, the malicious agents steer the network of agents away from the optimal solution by…

We consider the setting of agents cooperatively minimizing the sum of local objectives plus a regularizer on a graph. This paper proposes a primal-dual method in consideration of three distinctive attributes of real-life multi-agent…

The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings.…

In decentralized decision-making problems, communicating agents choose their actions based on locally available information and knowledge about decision rules or strategies of other agents. In this work, we consider a strategic…

Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relevant state drawn independently and identically from an…

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (a.k.a. contract) so as to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action. We relax the assumption that the principal perfectly…

We are given an equal number of mobile robotic agents, and distinct target locations. Each agent has simple integrator dynamics, a limited communication range, and knowledge of the position of every target. We address the problem of…

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

In this paper we consider a network of processors aiming at cooperatively solving linear programming problems subject to uncertainty. Each node only knows a common cost function and its local uncertain constraint set. We propose a…