Related papers: Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communicati…
Bayesian persuasion is a model for understanding strategic information revelation: an agent with an informational advantage, called a sender, strategically discloses information by sending signals to another agent, called a receiver. In…
We study computational questions in a game-theoretic model that, in particular, aims to capture advertising/persuasion applications such as viral marketing. Specifically, we consider a multi-agent Bayesian persuasion model where an informed…
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…
The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that,…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing attention has been devoted to relaxing the assumption that…
The celebrated Bayesian persuasion model considers strategic communication between an informed agent (the sender) and uninformed decision makers (the receivers). The current rapidly-growing literature mostly assumes a dichotomy: either the…
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard…
We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the existence of externalities in the agents' utilities, the…
We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…
Persuasion, defined as the act of exploiting an informational advantage in order to effect the decisions of others, is ubiquitous. Indeed, persuasive communication has been estimated to account for almost a third of all economic activity in…
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the…
We address Bayesian persuasion between a sender and a receiver with state-dependent quadratic cost measures for general classes of distributions. The receiver seeks to make mean-square-error estimate of a state based on a signal sent by the…
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there…
We study Bayesian persuasion under approximate best response, where the receiver may choose any action that is not too much suboptimal given their posterior belief upon receiving the signal. We focus on the computational aspects of the…
Bayesian persuasion, an extension of cheap-talk communication, involves an informed sender committing to a signaling scheme to influence a receiver's actions. Compared to cheap talk, this sender's commitment enables the receiver to verify…
We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different…
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the…
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…