Related papers: Social Learning in Non-Stationary Environments

We study dynamic reputation in a social-learning environment where only purchase decisions are observable. A long-lived seller posts a fixed price and chooses costly product quality in each period before interacting with short-lived buyers…

This paper studies strategic communication in the context of social learning. Product reviews are used by consumers to learn product quality, but in order to write a review, a consumer must be convinced to purchase the item first. When…

When launching new products, firms face uncertainty about market reception. Online reviews provide valuable information not only to consumers but also to firms, allowing firms to adjust the product characteristics, including its selling…

"Spillover" learning is defined as customers' learning about the quality of a service (or product) from their previous experiences with similar yet not identical services. In this paper, we propose a novel, parsimonious and general Bayesian…

User opinions expressed in the form of ratings can influence an individual's view of an item. However, the true quality of an item is often obfuscated by user biases, and it is not obvious from the observed ratings the importance different…

Many consumer decisions are repeated choices under uncertainty. Standard models capture these decisions using Bayesian learning and dynamic programming: consumers update beliefs from feedback and use those beliefs to guide future choices.…

Non-Bayesian social learning theory provides a framework that models distributed inference for a group of agents interacting over a social network. In this framework, each agent iteratively forms and communicates beliefs about an unknown…

We study a social learning model in which agents iteratively update their beliefs about the true state of the world using private signals and the beliefs of other agents in a non-Bayesian manner. Some agents are stubborn, meaning they…

We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves endogenously because of learning-by-consuming. A seller sells one unit of a divisible good, while the buyer relies on his private, rough valuation to choose his…

We study social learning from multiple experts whose precision is unknown and who care about reputation. The observer both learns a persistent state and ranks experts. In a binary baseline we characterize per-period equilibria: high types…

Autonomous agents operating in sequential decision-making tasks under uncertainty can benefit from external action suggestions, which provide valuable guidance but inherently vary in reliability. Existing methods for incorporating such…

We study a model of social learning from reviews where customers are computationally limited and make purchases based on reading only the first few reviews displayed by the platform. Under this limited attention, we establish that the…

I study a social learning model in which the object to learn is a strategic player's endogenous actions rather than an exogenous state. A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers and decides whether to build a reputation for supplying high…

Social learning is defined as the ability of a population to aggregate information, a process which must crucially depend on the mechanisms of social interaction. Consumers choosing which product to buy, or voters deciding which option to…

We study sequential social learning with endogenous information acquisition when agents have a taste for nonconformity. Each agent observes predecessors' actions, chooses whether to acquire a private signal (and its precision), and then…

In online marketplaces, customers have access to hundreds of reviews for a single product. Buyers often use reviews from other customers that share their type -- such as height for clothing, skin type for skincare products, and location for…

Maximizing long-term rewards is the primary goal in sequential decision-making problems. The majority of existing methods assume that side information is freely available, enabling the learning agent to observe all features' states before…

We explore a model of duopolistic competition in which consumers learn about the fit of each competitor's product. In equilibrium, consumers comparison shop: they learn only about the relative values of the products. When information is…

Many policy counterfactuals depend on how consumers value product attributes such as sugar, sodium, caffeine, alcohol, or emissions. Standard hedonic and differentiated-products models interpret these valuations statically. That…

An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this…