Related papers: Budget-balanced and strategy-proof auctions for mu…
Ridesharing has great potential to improve transportation efficiency while reducing congestion and pollution. To realize this potential, mechanisms are needed that allocate vehicles optimally and provide the right incentives to riders.…
This paper evaluates the benefit of integrating vehicle-based mobile crowd-sensing tasks into the ride-hailing system through the collaboration between the data user and the ride-hailing platform. In such a system, the ride-hailing platform…
Transportation Network Companies employ dynamic pricing methods at periods of peak travel to incentivise driver participation and balance supply and demand for rides. Surge pricing multipliers are commonly used and are applied following…
To address the demand of exponentially increasing end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this, spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the…
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the…
This paper studies the optimal spatial pricing for a ride-sourcing platform subject to a congestion charge. The platform determines the ride prices over the transportation network to maximize its profit, while the regulatory agency imposes…
Motivated by sponsored search auctions, we study multi-unit auctions with budget constraints. In the mechanism we propose, Sort-Cut, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since Sort-Cut's revenue is increasing in budgets and…
Mobility-on-demand (MoD) ridesharing is a promising way to improve the occupancy rate of personal vehicles and reduce traffic congestion and emissions. Maximizing the number of passengers served and maximizing a profit target are major…
Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical \emph{utility…
This paper is about allocation of an infinitely divisible good to several rational and strategic agents. The allocation is done by a social planner who has limited information because the agents' valuation functions are taken to be private…
The design of integrated mobility-on-demand services requires jointly considering the interactions between traveler choice behavior and operators' operation policies to design a financially sustainable pricing scheme. However, most existing…
This paper proposes a general equilibrium model for multi-passenger ridesharing systems, in which interactions between ridesharing drivers, passengers, platforms, and transportation networks are endogenously captured. Stable matching is…
While multimodal mobility systems have the potential to bring many benefits to travelers, drivers, the environment, and traffic congestion, such systems typically involve multiple non-cooperative decision-makers who may selfishly optimize…
In the context of `Everything-as-a-Service', the transportation sector has been evolving towards user-centric business models in which customized services and mode-agnostic mobility resources are priced in a unified framework. Yet, in the…
In this paper a new mathematical model is proposed for task scheduling and resource allocation in Grid systems. In this novel model, load balancing, starvation prevention and failing strategies are stated as the constraints and the solution…
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…
Both ride-hailing services and electric vehicles are becoming increasingly popular and it is likely that charging management of the ride-hailing vehicles will be a significant part of the ride-hailing company's operation in the near future.…
We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multi-dimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial)…
We consider the Arrow--Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents' demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for…
The focus of classic mechanism design has been on truthful direct-revelation mechanisms. In the context of combinatorial auctions the truthful direct-revelation mechanism that maximizes social welfare is the VCG mechanism. For many…