Related papers: Market Pricing for Matroid Rank Valuations

We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered "easy": multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial…

Determinant maximization provides an elegant generalization of problems in many areas, including convex geometry, statistics, machine learning, fair allocation of goods, and network design. In an instance of the determinant maximization…

We study the combinatorial contracting problem of D\"utting et al. [FOCS '21], in which a principal seeks to incentivize an agent to take a set of costly actions. In their model, there is a binary outcome (the agent can succeed or fail),…

Motivated by the dynamic assortment offerings and item pricings occurring in e-commerce, we study a general problem of allocating finite inventories to heterogeneous customers arriving sequentially. We analyze this problem under the…

Maintaining a maximum bipartite matching online while minimizing recourse/augmentations is a well studied problem, motivated by content delivery, job scheduling, and hashing. A breakthrough result of Bernstein, Holm, and Rotenberg…

A truthful mechanism for a Bayesian single-item auction results with some ex-ante revenue for the seller, and some ex-ante total surplus for the buyers. We study the Pareto frontier of the set of seller-buyers ex-ante utilities, generated…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…

Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study {\em budget feasible mechanisms} where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a matroid $\mathcal{M}=(E,\mathcal{I})$ where…

We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -\epsilon}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use…

For two matroids $M_1$ and $M_2$ with the same ground set $V$ and two cost functions $w_1$ and $w_2$ on $2^V$, we consider the problem of finding bases $X_1$ of $M_1$ and $X_2$ of $M_2$ minimizing $w_1(X_1)+w_2(X_2)$ subject to a certain…

We study the matroid secretary problems with submodular valuation functions. In these problems, the elements arrive in random order. When one element arrives, we have to make an immediate and irrevocable decision on whether to accept it or…

In this work, we conduct an extensive empirical study of several deep reinforcement learning algorithms on two challenging combinatorial optimization problems: the job-shop and flexible job-shop scheduling problems, both fundamental…

We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…

Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…

Adopting a zonal structure of electricity market requires specification of zones' borders. In this paper we use social welfare as the measure to assess quality of various zonal divisions. The social welfare is calculated by Market Coupling…

In the ordinal Matroid Secretary Problem (MSP), elements from a weighted matroid are presented in random order to an algorithm that must incrementally select a large weight independent set. However, the algorithm can only compare pairs of…

Research in explorable uncertainty addresses combinatorial optimization problems where there is partial information about the values of numeric input parameters, and exact values of these parameters can be determined by performing costly…

In this paper, we present a new model and two mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments, and is applicable to a wide…

We study a natural combinatorial pricing problem for sequentially arriving buyers with equal budgets. Each buyer is interested in exactly one pair of items and purchases this pair if and only if, upon arrival, both items are still available…