Related papers: Efficiency of equilibria in games with random payo…
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…
This paper introduces a novel payoff-based learning scheme for distributed optimization in repeatedly-played strategic-form games. Standard reinforcement-based learning exhibits several limitations with respect to their asymptotic…
We provide a game-theoretic analysis of consensus, assuming that processes are controlled by rational agents and may fail by crashing. We consider agents that \emph{care only about consensus}: that is, (a) an agent's utility depends only on…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria. In this paper, we examine a specific type of public goods game where players are networked and each has binary actions,…
We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…
We consider the class of two-person ordinal potential games where each player has the same number of actions $K$. Each game in this class admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium and the best-response dynamics converges to one of these…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed channel allocation in large networks under the frequency-selective interference channel. Performance is measured by the weighted sum of achievable rates. First we present a natural…
Many important real-world settings contain multiple players interacting over an unknown duration with probabilistic state transitions, and are naturally modeled as stochastic games. Prior research on algorithms for stochastic games has…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of…
We consider a nonzero-sum N-player Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The payoff functions are bounded Carath\'eodory functions and the transitions of the system are assumed to have a…
Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…
We study discrete two player all-pay auction with complete information. We provide full characterization of mixed strategy Nash equilibria and show that they constitute a subset of Nash equilibria of discrete General Lotto game. We show…
A significant aspect of the study of quantum strategies is the exploration of the game-theoretic solution concept of the Nash equilibrium in relation to the quantization of a game. Pareto optimality is a refinement on the set of Nash…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
We consider a symmetric $n$-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with controlled jumps and mean-field type interaction among the players. Each player minimizes some expected cost by affecting the drift as well as the jump part of…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…