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While multi-agent trust region algorithms have achieved great success empirically in solving coordination tasks, most of them, however, suffer from a non-stationarity problem since agents update their policies simultaneously. In contrast, a…
Recently, a randomized mechanism has been discovered [Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan; STOC'11] for combinatorial auctions that is truthful in expectation and guarantees a (1-1/e)-approximation to the optimal social welfare when players have…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
In this paper we consider the problem of uniformity testing with limited memory. We observe a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables drawn from a distribution $p$ over $[n]$, which is either uniform or is…
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims at getting around this…
We consider the maximization problem of monotone submodular functions under an uncertain knapsack constraint. Specifically, the problem is discussed in the situation that the knapsack capacity is not given explicitly and can be accessed…
In this paper, we prove several new results that give new insights into bilinear systems. We discuss conditions for asymptotic stability using probabilistic arguments. Moreover, we provide a global characterization of reachability in…
Orthogonality constraints naturally appear in many machine learning problems, from principal component analysis to robust neural network training. They are usually solved using Riemannian optimization algorithms, which minimize the…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…
We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We…
An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…
For revenue and welfare maximization in single-dimensional Bayesian settings, Chawla et al. (STOC10) recently showed that sequential posted-price mechanisms (SPMs), though simple in form, can perform surprisingly well compared to the…
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in statistical methods that exhibit robust performance under distribution changes between training and test data. While most of the related research focuses on point predictions with the…
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1999) but allow…
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem satisfying weak budget balance, individual rationality, and…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…
We consider variants of the restricted assignment problem where a set of jobs has to be assigned to a set of machines, for each job a size and a set of eligible machines is given, and the jobs may only be assigned to eligible machines with…
In this paper, we study randomized methods for feedback design of uncertain systems. The first contribution is to derive the sample complexity of various constrained control problems. In particular, we show the key role played by the…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…