Related papers: Two New Impossibility Results for the Random Assig…
In this paper, we continue the study of robust satisfiability of promise CSPs (PCSPs), initiated in (Brakensiek, Guruswami, Sandeep, STOC 2023 / Discrete Analysis 2025), and obtain the following results: For the PCSP 1-in-3-SAT vs NAE-SAT…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of…
We examine the robustness of bottleneck assignment problems to perturbations in the assignment weights. We derive two algorithms that provide uncertainty bounds for robust assignment. We prove that the bottleneck assignment is guaranteed to…
In multi-type resource allocation (MTRA) problems, there are p $\ge$ 2 types of items, and n agents, who each demand one unit of items of each type, and have strict linear preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. For…
We study the problem of best-arm identification with fixed budget in stochastic multi-armed bandits with Bernoulli rewards. For the problem with two arms, also known as the A/B testing problem, we prove that there is no algorithm that (i)…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
The reverse engineering problem with probabilities and sequential behavior is introducing here, using the expression of an algorithm. The solution is partially founded, because we solve the problem only if we have a Probabilistic Sequential…
The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism…
We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…
We explore and relate two notions of monotonicity, stochastic and realizable, for a system of probability measures on a common finite partially ordered set (poset) S when the measures are indexed by another poset A. We give counterexamples…
Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given pre-specified turns and each agents gets the most preferred item that is still available. It has long been known that sequential allocation is not…
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For…
We study the efficiency (in terms of social welfare) of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching problems with {\em dichotomous preferences} and {\em normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences}. We are particularly…
This paper deals with the scenario approach to robust optimization. This relies on a random sampling of the possibly infinite number of constraints induced by uncertainties in the parameters of an optimization problem. Solving the resulting…
Under what condition is a random constraint satisfaction problem hard to refute by the sum-of-squares (SoS) algorithm? A sufficient condition is t-wise uniformity, that is, each constraint has a t-wise uniform distribution of satisfying…
We study the congested assignment problem as introduced by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2023). We show that deciding whether a competitive assignment exists can be done in polynomial time, while deciding whether an envy-free assignment exists is…
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [American Economic Review, 2017], strengthens the well-known…
Given a set of $n$ individuals with strict preferences over $m$ indivisible objects, the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) mechanism is a method for allocating objects to individuals in a way that is efficient, fair, and…
When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…