Related papers: Monotone and Online Fair Division
This work addresses learning online fair division under uncertainty, where a central planner sequentially allocates items without precise knowledge of agents' values or utilities. Departing from conventional online algorithm, the planner…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
Rankings have become the primary interface in two-sided online markets. Many have noted that the rankings not only affect the satisfaction of the users (e.g., customers, listeners, employers, travelers), but that the position in the ranking…
We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…
In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her $k$ most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We…
Consider a university assigning students to courses and dorms. While many mechanisms are available, they each have their own drawbacks. Running serial dictatorship once for all goods is highly unfair, but running serial dictatorship…
We introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness concepts for agents with weights that quantify their entitlements in the allocation of indivisible items. We propose two variants of weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1): strong,…
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods and chores among agents with \emph{lexicographic} preferences -- a subclass of additive valuations. In sharp contrast to the goods-only setting, we show that an allocation satisfying…
We study the problem of fairly allocating either a set of indivisible goods or a set of mixed divisible and indivisible goods (i.e., mixed goods) to agents with additive utilities, taking the best-of-both-worlds perspective of guaranteeing…
We consider the allocation of limited resources to heterogeneous customers who arrive in an online fashion. We would like to allocate the resources "fairly", so that no group of customers is marginalized in terms of their overall service…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a multiset $M$ of $m$ indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive valuations. Specifically, we introduce a parameter $t$ for the number of distinct types of items and study fair allocations of…
We initiate the study of the communication complexity of fair division with indivisible goods. We focus on some of the most well-studied fairness notions (envy-freeness, proportionality, and approximations thereof) and valuation classes…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
The online bipartite matching problem, extensively studied in the literature, deals with the allocation of online arriving vertices (items) to a predetermined set of offline vertices (agents). However, little attention has been given to the…
This paper explores the fair allocation of indivisible items in a multidimensional setting, motivated by the need to address fairness in complex environments where agents assess bundles according to multiple criteria. Such multidimensional…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or divisible, it is impossible to…