Related papers: Biased-Belief Equilibrium

We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…

Empirical evidence shows that human behaviour often deviates from game-theoretical rationality. For instance, humans may hold unrealistic expectations about future outcomes. As the evolutionary roots of such biases remain unclear, we…

We consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game in which one of the players has a private information on the game. Both players observe each other, so that the non-informed player can try to guess his missing information. Our…

When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…

We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games, namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the set of states and a…

We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend…

In many settings where multiple agents interact, the optimal choices for each agent depend heavily on the choices of the others. These coupled interactions are well-described by a general-sum differential game, in which players have…

In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…

Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order to model the incentives and behavior of voters. In a…

Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…

We investigate a linear quadratic stochastic zero-sum game where two players lobby a political representative to invest in a wind turbine farm. Players are time-inconsistent because they discount performance with a non-constant rate. Our…

We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one of the players, the social preferences of the players, or the…

We study the voting game where agents' preferences are endogenously decided by the information they receive, and they can collaborate in a group. We show that strategic voting behaviors have a positive impact on leading to the ``correct''…

Human coordination often relies on the ability to influence the beliefs of others through strategic action. In multi-agent reinforcement learning, opponent shaping attempts to replicate this influence, though existing methods typically…

We investigate symmetric equilibria of mutual reinforcement learning when both players alternately learn the optimal memory-two strategies against the opponent in the repeated prisoners' dilemma game. We provide a necessary condition for…

What would you do if you were invited to play a game where you were given \$25 and allowed to place bets for 30 minutes on a coin that you were told was biased to come up heads 60% of the time? This is exactly what we did, gathering 61…

Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior,…

We study a disclosure game with a large evidence space. There is an unknown binary state. A sender observes a sequence of binary signals about the state and discloses a left truncation of the sequence to a receiver in order to convince him…

We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…