Related papers: Extensive Infinite Games and Escalation, an exerci…
Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…
Something is definitely wrong. If the game has a linear winning strategy, then it is tractable. What's going on? Well, we describe a two-person game which has a definite winner, that is, a player who can force a win in a finite number of…
We provide a self-contained introduction to finite extensive games with perfect information. In these games players proceed in turns having, at each stage, finitely many moves to their disposal, each play always ends, and in each play the…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the…
Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…
The focus of this essay is a rigorous treatment of infinite games. An infinite game is defined as a play consisting of a fixed number of players whose sequence of moves is repeated, or iterated ad infinitum. Each sequence corresponds to a…
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…
Delay games are two-player games of infinite duration in which one player may delay her moves to obtain a lookahead on her opponent's moves. For $\omega$-regular winning conditions it is known that such games can be solved in…
Although mixed extensions of finite games always admit equilibria, this is not the case for countable games, the best-known example being Wald's pick-the-larger-integer game. Several authors have provided conditions for the existence of…
We show open games cover extensive form games with both perfect and imperfect information. Doing so forces us to address two current weaknesses in open games: the lack of a notion of player and their agency within open games, and the lack…
We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…
We introduce two-player games which build words over infinite alphabets, and we study the problem of checking the existence of winning strategies. These games are played by two players, who take turns in choosing valuations for variables…
In the empirical approach to game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), the model of the game comes not from declarative representation, but is derived by interrogation of a procedural description of the game environment. The motivation for developing…
In the recently introduced topological distance games, strategic agents need to be assigned to a subset of vertices of a topology. In the assignment, the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents…
We introduce operational semantics into games. And based on the operational semantics, we establish a full algebra of games, including basic algebra of games, algebra of concurrent games, recursion and abstraction. The algebra can be used…
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steady-states of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are…
We consider a dynamical approach to sequential games. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding restriction…
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be…
Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…