Related papers: Teamwise Mean Field Competitions
We introduce a mean field game with rank-based reward: competing agents optimize their effort to achieve a goal, are ranked according to their completion time, and paid a reward based on their relative rank. First, we propose a tractable…
We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…
The theory of Mean-Field Games is interested in the behaviour of interacting particle systems in which the individual interaction between particles (players) decreases as the size of the population increases. In recent years, it was…
Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…
This article considers a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion models in which agents aim at reaching a given target set and wish to minimize a cost consisting of an individual running cost, an individual cost depending on the…
In this paper, we present a model of a game among teams. Each team consists of a homogeneous population of agents. Agents within a team are cooperative while the teams compete with other teams. The dynamics and the costs are coupled through…
We study nondeterministic strategies in parity games with the aim of computing a most permissive winning strategy. Following earlier work, we measure permissiveness in terms of the average number/weight of transitions blocked by the…
We study a family of mean field games with a state variable evolving as a multivariate jump diffusion process. The jump component is driven by a Poisson process with a time-dependent intensity function. All coefficients, i.e. drift,…
Teams frequently compete on multiple fronts: political parties contest districts for majority control, contractors field specialized units to win procurement contracts, and squads play match by match for titles. Although the prize accrues…
In this paper we explore the impact of quantiles on optimal strategies under state dynamics driven by both individual noise, common noise and Poisson jumps. We first establish an optimality system satisfied the quantile process under jump…
In this work, we systematically investigate mean field games and mean field type control problems with multiple populations using a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type stemming from…
We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schr\"{o}dinger bridges we are able to…
We discuss a natural game of competition and solve the corresponding mean field game with \emph{common noise} when agents' rewards are \emph{rank dependent}. We use this solution to provide an approximate Nash equilibrium for the finite…
We investigate how the framework of mean-field games may be used to investigate strategic interactions in large heterogeneous populations. We consider strategic interactions in a population of players which may be partitioned into…
The task of ranking individuals or teams, based on a set of comparisons between pairs, arises in various contexts, including sporting competitions and the analysis of dominance hierarchies among animals and humans. Given data on which…
We formulate a mean field game where each player stops a privately observed Brownian motion with absorption. Players are ranked according to their level of stopping and rewarded as a function of their relative rank. There is a unique mean…
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and robust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between teams are treated. We provide a…
Quantilized mean-field game models involve quantiles of the population's distribution. We study a class of such games with a capacity for ranking games, where the performance of each agent is evaluated based on its terminal state relative…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…