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Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that…
In this paper, we introduce a Bayesian revenue-maximizing mechanism design model where the items have fixed, exogenously-given prices. Buyers are unit-demand and have an ordinal ranking over purchasing either one of these items at its given…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…
With the rapid growth in the fashion e-commerce industry, it is becoming extremely challenging for the E-tailers to set an optimal price point for all the products on the platform. By establishing an optimal price point, they can maximize…
We study a novel automated market maker design: the function maximizing AMM (FM-AMM). Our central assumption is that trades are batched before execution. Because of competition between arbitrageurs, the FM-AMM eliminates arbitrage profits…
We study decentralized markets for goods whose utility perishes in time, with compute as a primary motivation. Recent advances in reproducible and verifiable execution allow jobs to pause, verify, and resume across heterogeneous hardware,…
Designing revenue optimal auctions for selling an item to $n$ symmetric bidders is a fundamental problem in mechanism design. Myerson (1981) shows that the second price auction with an appropriate reserve price is optimal when bidders'…
Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting,…
The revenue optimal mechanism for selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values is complex for agents with linear utility (Myerson,1981) and has no closed-form characterization for agents with…
In this paper we propose a new optimization model for maximum likelihood estimation of causal and invertible ARMA models. Through a set of numerical experiments we show how our proposed model outperforms, both in terms of quality of the…
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…
The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets, under general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
This study investigates the development of an optimal execution strategy through reinforcement learning, aiming to determine the most effective approach for traders to buy and sell inventory within a finite time horizon. Our proposed model…
We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of the signals. We introduce a variant of the…
We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with $m$ items and $n$ budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appraises at some single-value every item in her preference-set.…
The Alternating Minimization Algorithm (AMA) has been proposed by Tseng to solve convex programming problems with two-block separable linear constraints and objectives, whereby (at least) one of the components of the latter is assumed to be…
In this work we study the optimal execution problem with multiplicative price impact in algorithm trading, when an agent holds an initial position of shares of a financial asset. The inter-selling-decision times are modelled by the arrival…