Related papers: A Survey of Published Attacks on Intel SGX
Processing sensitive data, such as those produced by body sensors, on third-party untrusted clouds is particularly challenging without compromising the privacy of the users generating it. Typically, these sensors generate large quantities…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Protection of data-in-use is a key priority, for which Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technology has unarguably emerged as a, possibly the most, promising solution. Multiple server-side TEE offerings have been released over the years,…
Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) is a promising technology to securely process information in otherwise untrusted environments. An important aspect of Intel SGX is the ability to perform remote attestation to assess the…
Intel's software guard extensions (SGX) provide hardware enclaves to guarantee confidentiality and integrity for sensitive code and data. However, systems leveraging such security mechanisms must often pay high performance overheads. A…
Intel SGX Guard eXtensions (SGX), a hardware-supported trusted execution environment (TEE), is designed to protect security-sensitive applications. However, since enclave applications are developed with memory unsafe languages such as…
This paper demonstrates that SSDs, which perform device-level versioning, can be exposed to data tampering attacks when the retention time of data is less than the malware's dwell time. To deal with that threat, we propose SGX-SSD, a…
The growing adoption of IoT devices in our daily life is engendering a data deluge, mostly private information that needs careful maintenance and secure storage system to ensure data integrity and protection. Also, the prodigious IoT…
Software-based approaches for search over encrypted data are still either challenged by lack of proper, low-leakage encryption or slow performance. Existing hardware-based approaches do not scale well due to hardware limitations and…
Exceptions are a commodity hardware functionality which is central to multi-tasking OSes as well as event-driven user applications. Normally, the OS assists the user application by lifting the semantics of exceptions received from hardware…
Hardware support for trusted execution in modern CPUs enables tenants to shield their data processing workloads in otherwise untrusted cloud environments. Runtime systems for the trusted execution must rely on an interface to the untrusted…
Forking attacks against TEEs like Intel SGX can be carried out either by rolling back the application to a previous state, or by cloning the application and by partitioning its inputs across the cloned instances. Current solutions to…
In the last two decades, the evolving cyber-threat landscape has brought to center stage the contentious tradeoffs between the security and performance of modern microprocessors. The guarantees provided by the hardware to ensure no…
Besides Intel's SGX technology, there are long-running discussions on how trusted computing technologies can be used to cloak malware. Past research showed example methods of malicious activities utilising Flicker, Trusted Platform Module,…
Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been proposed as a solution to protect code confidentiality in scenarios where computation is outsourced to an untrusted operator. We study the resilience of such solutions to side-channel attacks…
Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…
Searchable encryption (SE) is one of the key enablers for building encrypted databases. It allows a cloud server to search over encrypted data without decryption. Dynamic SE additionally includes data addition and deletion operations to…
A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims to allow the parties to learn the output of function $f$ of their private inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol realizes a trusted oracle that…
Encrypted databases have been studied for more than 10 years and are quickly emerging as a critical technology for the cloud. The current state of the art is to use property-preserving encrypting techniques (e.g., deterministic encryption)…