Related papers: SCARE: Side Channel Attack on In-Memory Computing …
Gate camouflaging is a known security enhancement technique that tries to thwart reverse engineering by hiding the functions of gates or the connections between them. A number of works on SAT-based attacks have shown that it is often…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
Spectre intrusions exploit speculative execution design vulnerabilities in modern processors. The attacks violate the principles of isolation in programs to gain unauthorized private user information. Current state-of-the-art detection…
The rapid advancement of neuromorphic technology aims to address the memory wall challenge inherent in conventional von Neumann architectures. This paper critically examines current digital neuromorphic processors and their strategies to…
The widespread integration of embedded systems across various industries has facilitated seamless connectivity among devices and bolstered computational capabilities. Despite their extensive applications, embedded systems encounter…
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a typical attack technique that exploits return addresses to abuse existing code repeatedly. Most of the current return address protecting mechanisms (also known as the Backward-Edge Control-Flow…
Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) is a prominent tool to break mathematically-secure cryptographic engines, especially on resource-constrained IoT devices. Presently, to perform EM SCA on an embedded IoT device, the entire…
We consider the wiretap channel, where the individual channel uses have memory or are influenced by an adversary. We analyze the explicit and computationally efficient construction of information-theoretically secure coding schemes which…
This paper presents an innovative approach utilizing in-memory computing (IMC) for the development and integration of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) cipher technique. Our research aims to enhance cybersecurity measures for a wide range…
While modern masking schemes provide provable security against passive side-channel analysis (SCA), such as power analysis, single faults can be employed to recover the secret key of ciphers even in masked implementations. In this paper, we…
The massive trend toward embedded systems introduces new security threats to prevent. Malicious firmware makes it easier to launch cyberattacks against embedded systems. Systems infected with malicious firmware maintain the appearance of…
Power side-channel analysis (SCA) has been of immense interest to most embedded designers to evaluate the physical security of the system. This work presents profiling-based cross-device power SCA attacks using deep learning techniques on…
To make cryptographic processors more resilient against side-channel attacks, engineers have developed various countermeasures. However, the effectiveness of these countermeasures is often uncertain, as it depends on the complex interplay…
We present the first rigorous security, performance, energy, and cost analyses of the state-of-the-art on-DRAM-die read disturbance mitigation method, Per Row Activation Counting (PRAC), described in JEDEC DDR5 specification's April 2024…
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) has been an active area of research for the past two decades to study the attacks for extracting secret information from cryptographic implementations through power measurements and their defenses.…
The security of modern electronic devices relies on secret keys stored on secure hardware modules as the root-of-trust (RoT). Extracting those keys would break the security of the entire system. As shown before, sophisticated side-channel…
This paper obtains fundamental limits on the computational precision of in-memory computing architectures (IMCs). An IMC noise model and associated SNR metrics are defined and their interrelationships analyzed to show that the accuracy of…
Shared caches are vulnerable to side channel attacks through contention in cache sets. Besides being a simple source of information leak, these side channels form useful gadgets for more sophisticated attacks that compromise the security of…
Side channel attacks are a major class of attacks to crypto-systems. Attackers collect and analyze timing behavior, I/O data, or power consumption in these systems to undermine their effectiveness in protecting sensitive information. In…
Conventional in-memory computing (IMC) architectures consist of analog memristive crossbars to accelerate matrix-vector multiplication (MVM), and digital functional units to realize nonlinear vector (NLV) operations in deep neural networks…