Related papers: Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Beha…

A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of…

A patient firm interacts with a sequence of consumers. The firm is either an honest type who supplies high quality and never erases its records, or an opportunistic type who chooses what quality to supply and may erase its records at a low…

We analyze situations in which players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player facing a sequence of short-run opponents makes an announcement about their intended action after observing an…

We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We…

I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…

We study reputation formation where a long-run player repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions. Short-run players observe the long-run player's past actions but not her past signals. The long-run player can thus develop a…

I study reputation formation in repeated games where player actions endogenously determine the probability the game permanently ends. Permanent exit can render reputation useless even to a patient long-lived player whose actions are…

We analyze a reputational bargaining game in which a central player negotiates simultaneously with two peripheral players. Each player is either rational or a commitment type who never concedes and insists on a fixed share, and concessions…

Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we…

I revisit the canonical reputation framework in which a long-lived player interacts with a sequence of short-lived opponents and may be either strategic or a commitment type who always plays the same, possibly mixed, action. I depart by…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…

Many online marketplaces enjoy great success. Buyers and sellers in successful markets carry out cooperative transactions even if they do not know each other in advance and a moral hazard exists. An indispensable component that enables…

To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…

This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…

I prove that it is irrational for agents with even slightly private preferences to condition their strategy on private information that is payoff-irrelevant to them, contrary to powerful techniques for analyzing communication and repeated…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…