Related papers: Repeated Communication with Private Lying Cost

An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…

An informed Advisor and an uninformed Decision-Maker, with conflicting interests, engage in repeated cheap talk communication in always new decision problems. While the Decision-Maker's optimal payoff is attainable in some subgame-perfect…

We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores…

We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…

We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…

The spread of disinformation poses a significant threat to societal well-being. We analyze this phenomenon using an evolutionary game theory model of the sender-receiver game, where senders aim to mislead receivers and receivers aim to…

Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…

We consider a sender-receiver game in which the receiver's action is binary and the sender's preferences are state-independent. The state is multidimensional. The receiver can select one dimension of the state to check (i.e., observe)…

In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…

We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if…

We study a communication game between a sender and a receiver. The sender chooses one of her signals about the state of the world (i.e., anecdotes) and communicates to the receiver who takes an action affecting both players. The sender and…

We model the communication of narratives as a cheap-talk game under model uncertainty. The sender has private information about the true data generating process of publicly observable data. The receiver is uncertain about how to interpret…

This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…