Related papers: Duplicity Games for Deception Design with an Appli…
We study a sequential mechanism design problem in which a principal seeks to elicit truthful reports from multiple rational agents while starting with no prior knowledge of agents' beliefs. We introduce Distributionally Robust Adaptive…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…
To counter man-at-the-end attacks such as reverse engineering and tampering, software is often protected with techniques that require support modules to be linked into the application. It is well-known, however, that attackers can exploit…
Despite the intrinsic risk-awareness of Large Language Models (LLMs), current defenses often result in shallow safety alignment, rendering models vulnerable to disguised attacks (e.g., prefilling) while degrading utility. To bridge this…
Defending against sophisticated cyber threats demands strategic allocation of limited security resources across complex network infrastructures. When the defender has limited defensive resources, the complexity of coordinating honeypot…
We present novel perfect secrecy systems that provide immunity to spoofing attacks under equiprobable source probability distributions. On the theoretical side, relying on an existence result for $t$-designs by Teirlinck, our construction…
The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her limited resources to defend critical targets and the attacker…
Machine Learning is becoming a pivotal aspect of many systems today, offering newfound performance on classification and prediction tasks, but this rapid integration also comes with new unforeseen vulnerabilities. To harden these systems…
Effective game-theoretic modeling of defender-attacker behavior is becoming increasingly important. In many domains, the defender functions not only as a player but also the designer of the game's payoff structure. We study Stackelberg…
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game and let attack and defense strategies evolve…
Backdoor attacks change a small portion of training data by introducing hand-crafted triggers and rewiring the corresponding labels towards a desired target class. Training on such data injects a backdoor which causes malicious inference in…
In structured decision-making workflows such as form filling, compliance checking, and maintenance reporting, LLM outputs must be locally correct, globally consistent, and auditable against task-specific rules. Existing refinement methods…
Vision-language models (VLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in perceptual tasks, yet they degrade in complex multi-hop reasoning under multiplayer game settings with imperfect and deceptive information. In this paper, we study a…
We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…
Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk management of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions. This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk management based on a…
This paper proposes a game-theoretic method to address the problem of optimal detector placement in a networked control system under cyber-attacks. The networked control system is composed of interconnected agents where each agent is…
In this work we investigate the problem of simultaneous privacy and integrity protection in cryptographic circuits. We consider a white-box scenario with a powerful, yet limited attacker. A concise metric for the level of probing and fault…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
Hallucination continues to pose a major obstacle in the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Although the Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) paradigm offers a promising solution by promoting consensus among multiple agents to…
We consider a communication scenario, in which an intruder tries to determine the modulation scheme of the intercepted signal. Our aim is to minimize the accuracy of the intruder, while guaranteeing that the intended receiver can still…