Related papers: Delegation in Veto Bargaining
I formulate and characterize the following two-stage choice behavior. The decision maker is endowed with two preferences. She shortlists all maximal alternatives according to the first preference. If the first preference is decisive, in the…
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In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to…
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We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving…
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The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…
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We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such a scenario happens, for instance, when a committee selects…
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We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes to profit from the trader's activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader's position and learns from observed price…
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Despite abundant negotiation strategies in literature, the complexity of automated negotiation forbids a single strategy from being dominant against all others in different negotiation scenarios. To overcome this, one approach is to use…