Related papers: Sparsified Linear Programming for Zero-Sum Equilib…
We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…
Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equilibria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain…
We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…
In this paper we propose a new iterative algorithm to solve the fair PCA (FPCA) problem. We start with the max-min fair PCA formulation originally proposed in [1] and derive a simple and efficient iterative algorithm which is based on the…
Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithms are a foundational class of methods for solving imperfect-information games, with the time average of their iterates converging to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games. Prior…
Poker, also known as Texas Hold'em, has always been a typical research target within imperfect information games (IIGs). IIGs have long served as a measure of artificial intelligence (AI) development. Representative prior works, such as…
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…
Parallelization has played an instrumental role in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), drastically reducing the time taken to train and evaluate large AI models. In contrast to its impact in the broader field of AI, applying…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
A recent paper by Farina & Pipis (2023) established the existence of uncoupled no-linear-swap regret dynamics with polynomial-time iterations in extensive-form games. The equilibrium points reached by these dynamics, known as linear…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
This paper presents fast first-order methods for solving linear programs (LPs) approximately. We adapt online linear programming algorithms to offline LPs and obtain algorithms that avoid any matrix multiplication. We also introduce a…
A dominant approach to solving large imperfect-information games is Counterfactural Regret Minimization (CFR). In CFR, many regret minimization problems are combined to solve the game. For very large games, abstraction is typically needed…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
We define a class of zero-sum games with combinatorial structure, where the best response problem of one player is to maximize a submodular function. For example, this class includes security games played on networks, as well as the problem…
We consider the problem of efficiently solving large-scale linear least squares problems that have one or more linear constraints that must be satisfied exactly. Whilst some classical approaches are theoretically well founded, they can face…