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In this paper we present a new modelling framework combining replicator dynamics (which is the standard model of frequency dependent selection) with the model of an age-structured population. The new framework allows for the modelling of…
We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…
Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in…
A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners…
Using demographic data of high spatial resolution for a region in the south of Europe, we study the population over fixed-size spatial cells. We find that, counterintuitively, the distribution of the number of inhabitants per cell increases…
We propose a new evolutionary dynamics for population games with a discrete strategy set, inspired by the theory of optimal transport and Mean field games. The dynamics can be described as a Fokker-Planck equation on a discrete strategy…
We study a system of self-propelled, proliferating finite-size disks with game-theoretical interactions, where growth rates depend on local population composition. We analyze how these interactions influence spatial distribution,…
Evolutionary game theory combines game theory and dynamical systems and is customarily adopted to describe evolutionary dynamics in multi-agent systems. In particular, it has been proven to be a successful tool to describe multi-agent…
The evolution of an infinite population of interacting point entities placed in $\mathbb{R}^d$ is studied. The elementary evolutionary acts are death of an entity with rate that includes a competition term and independent fission into two…
The emergence and promotion of cooperation are two of the main issues in evolutionary game theory, as cooperation is amenable to exploitation by defectors, which take advantage of cooperative individuals at no cost, dooming them to…
A reaction--diffusion replicator equation is studied. A novel method to apply the principle of global regulation is used to write down the model with explicit spatial structure. Properties of stationary solutions together with their…
In binary decision-making, individuals often choose either the rare or the common action. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, the best-response update rule can be used to model this dichotomy. Those who prefer the common action…
In panel experiments, we randomly assign units to different interventions, measuring their outcomes, and repeating the procedure in several periods. Using the potential outcomes framework, we define finite population dynamic causal effects…
A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2 x 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire…
The population dynamics that evolves in the radial symmetric geometry is investigated. The nonlinear reaction-diffusion model, which depends on population density, is employed as the governing equation for this system. The approximate…
Replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of Multiplicative Weights Updates, is the main dynamic in evolutionary game theory. In simple evolutionary zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-Scissors, replicator dynamic is periodic…
Population structure induced by both spatial embedding and more general networks of interaction, such as model social networks, have been shown to have a fundamental effect on the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary games. These effects…
The appropriate description of fluctuations within the framework of evolutionary game theory is a fundamental unsolved problem in the case of finite populations. The Moran process recently introduced into this context [Nowak et al., Nature…
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…
This paper studies a meta-simplex concept and geometric embedding framework for multi-population replicator dynamics. Central results are two embedding theorems which constitute a formal reduction of multi-population replicator dynamics to…