Related papers: On Sustainable Equilibria
We consider an algorithmic framework for two-player non-zero-sum semidefinite games, where each player's strategy is a positive semidefinite matrix with trace one. We formulate the computation of Nash equilibria in such games as…
In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash…
The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…
Discrete-time replicator map is a prototype of evolutionary selection game dynamical models that have been very successful across disciplines in rendering insights into the attainment of the equilibrium outcomes, like the Nash equilibrium…
In this paper, we study the dynamic behavior of Hedge, a well-known algorithm in theoretical machine learning and algorithmic game theory. The empirical average (arithmetic mean) of the iterates Hedge generates is known to converge to a…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…
Economists were content with the concept of the Nash equilibrium as game theory's solution concept until Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou showed that finding a Nash equilibrium is most likely a computationally hard problem, a result…
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response…
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact…
We introduce a new class of population games that we call monotropic; these are games characterized by the presence of a unique globally neutrally stable Nash equilibrium. Monotropic games generalize strictly concave potential games and…
We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework,…
We introduce a class of Bayesian bidding games for which we prove that the set of pure Nash equilibria is a (non-empty) sublattice and we give a sufficient condition for uniqueness that is often verified in the context of markets with…
We investigate the complexity of bounding the uncertainty of graphical games, and we provide new insight into the intrinsic difficulty of computing Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that, if one adds very simple and natural additional…
In general, Nash equilibria in normal-form games may require players to play (probabilistically) mixed strategies. We define a measure of the complexity of finite probability distributions and study the complexity required to play Nash…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
In this paper, an aggregate game approach is proposed for the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid. Since the electricity user's cost function depends on the aggregate load, which is unknown to the end users, an…
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be…
In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…
In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super-Nash performance, and a solution concept, optimin, whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves…