Related papers: Sybil-proof Answer Querying Mechanism
This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded by the owner for contributing to the solution, for…
In this paper, we study incentive mechanisms for retrieving information from networked agents. Following the model in [Kleinberg and Raghavan 2005], the agents are represented as nodes in an infinite tree, which is generated by a random…
This paper examines the problem of distributing rewards on social networks to improve the efficiency of crowdsourcing tasks for sponsors. To complete the tasks efficiently, we aim to design reward mechanisms that incentivize early-joining…
Sybil attacks, in which fake or duplicate identities (\emph{sybils}) infiltrate an online community, pose a serious threat to such communities, as they might tilt community-wide decisions in their favor. While the extensive research on…
This paper reviews the Sybil attack in social networks, which has the potential to compromise the whole distributed network. In the Sybil attack, the malicious user claims multiple identities to compromise the network. Sybil attacks can be…
We investigate the problem of sybil (fake account) detection in social networks from a graph algorithms perspective, where graph structural information is used to classify users as sybil and benign. We introduce the novel notion of user…
A diffusion auction is a market to sell commodities over a social network, where the challenge is to incentivize existing buyers to invite their neighbors in the network to join the market. Existing mechanisms have been designed to solve…
Detecting and suspending fake accounts (Sybils) in online social networking (OSN) services protects both OSN operators and OSN users from illegal exploitation. Existing social-graph-based defense schemes effectively bound the accepted…
Consider a mechanism that cannot observe how many players there are directly, but instead must rely on their self-reports to know how many are participating. Suppose the players can create new identities to report to the auctioneer at some…
Restaking protocols expand validator responsibilities beyond consensus, but their security depends on resistance to Sybil attacks. We introduce a formal framework for Sybil-proofness in restaking networks, distinguishing between two types…
An exciting application of crowdsourcing is to use social networks in complex task execution. In this paper, we address the problem of a planner who needs to incentivize agents within a network in order to seek their help in executing an…
We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a…
Many distributed systems are subject to the Sybil attack, where an adversary subverts system operation by emulating behavior of multiple distinct nodes. Most recent work to address this problem leverages social networks to establish trust…
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…
Any decentralised distributed network is particularly vulnerable to the Sybil attack wherein a malicious node masquerades as several different nodes, called Sybil nodes, simultaneously in an attempt to disrupt the proper functioning of the…
Sybil attacks are becoming increasingly widespread, and pose a significant threat to online social systems; a single adversary can inject multiple colluding identities in the system to compromise security and privacy. Recent works have…
Enhancing resilience in multi-agent systems in the face of selfish agents is an important problem that requires further characterisation. This work develops a truthful mechanism that avoids self-interested and strategic agents maliciously…
In the realm of cost-sharing mechanisms, the vulnerability to Sybil strategies -- also known as false-name strategies, where agents create fake identities to manipulate outcomes -- has not yet been studied. In this paper, we delve into the…
TrueBit is a protocol that uses interactive verification to allow a resource-constrained computation environment like a blockchain to perform much larger computations than usual in a trusted way. As long as a single honest participant is…
Detecting fake users (also called Sybils) in online social networks is a basic security research problem. State-of-the-art approaches rely on a large amount of manually labeled users as a training set. These approaches suffer from three key…