Related papers: Periodic Strategies II: Generalizations and Extens…

We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…

We provide an in-depth study of Nash equilibria in multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs), i.e., normal form games with vectorial payoffs. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume that each player's utility can be modelled with a…

In this paper, we consider the $n \times n$ two-payer zero-sum repeated game in which one player (player X) employs the popular Hedge (also called multiplicative weights update) learning algorithm while the other player (player Y) adopts…

We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…

Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. A possible way to cope with selfishness is to compute a desired outcome (if it is tractable) and impose it. However…

In iterated games, a player can unilaterally exert influence over the outcome through a careful choice of strategy. A powerful class of such "payoff control" strategies was discovered by Press and Dyson (2012). Their so-called…

In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…

We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for "large" $n$-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player's utility is greatly affected by any other individual player's actions. In this paper, we…

This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…

We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…

This article explores the interaction of two agents during a geopolitical operation. Collaborative work is considered, rather than being done alone. However, each agent has the goal of maximizing personal net profit. We will have 3…

We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…

When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…

We investigate the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games. The main result of the paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the…

We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…

We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each step, an information system estimates a belief distribution of the parameter based on the players'…

In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…

An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…

We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely…