Related papers: Modified Schelling Games
We examine settings in which agents choose behaviors and care about their neighbors' behaviors, but have incomplete information about the network in which they are embedded. We develop a model in which agents use local knowledge of their…
Learning to detect, characterize and accommodate novelties is a challenge that agents operating in open-world domains need to address to be able to guarantee satisfactory task performance. Certain novelties (e.g., changes in environment…
We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…
Strategic diversity is often essential in games: in multi-player games, for example, evaluating a player against a diverse set of strategies will yield a more accurate estimate of its performance. Furthermore, in games with…
We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions…
We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a…
Stochastic patrol routing is known to be advantageous in adversarial settings; however, the optimal choice of stochastic routing strategy is dependent on a model of the adversary. We adopt a worst-case omniscient adversary model from the…
We put forward a new model of congestion games where agents have uncertainty over the routes used by other agents. We take a non-probabilistic approach, assuming that each agent knows that the number of agents using an edge is within a…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…
We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…
Communities typically capture homophily as people of the same community share many common features. This paper is motivated by the problem of community detection in social networks, as it can help improve our understanding of the network…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We study stochastic evolution of optional games on simple graphs. There are two strategies, A and B, whose interaction is described by a general payoff matrix. In addition there are one or several possibilities to opt out from the game by…
We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…
Schelling segregation is a well-established model used to investigate the dynamics of segregation in agent-based models. Since we consider segregation to be key for the development of political polarisation, we are interested in what…