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Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) is an NP-Hard problem in which agents are partitioned into mutually exclusive groups to maximize their social welfare. In this work, we propose QuACS, a novel hybrid quantum classical algorithm for…
Communities typically capture homophily as people of the same community share many common features. This paper is motivated by the problem of community detection in social networks, as it can help improve our understanding of the network…
Coalitional voting games appear in different forms in multi-agent systems, social choice and threshold logic. In this paper, the complexity of comparison of influence between players in coalitional voting games is characterized. The…
K-clique percolation is an overlapping community finding algorithm which extracts particular structures, comprised of overlapping cliques, from complex networks. While it is conceptually straightforward, and can be elegantly expressed using…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games,…
Bipartite graphs are a prevalent modeling tool for real-world networks, capturing interactions between vertices of two different types. Within this framework, bicliques emerge as crucial structures when studying dense subgraphs: they are…
We present a systematic, algebraically based, design methodology for efficient implementation of computer programs optimized over multiple levels of the processor/memory and network hierarchy. Using a common formalism to describe the…
The additively separable hedonic game (ASHG) is a model of coalition formation games on graphs. In this paper, we intensively and extensively investigate the computational complexity of finding several desirable solutions, such as a Nash…
Cooperative 2-matching games are a generalization of cooperative matching games, where the value function is given by maximum-weight b-matchings, for a vertex capacity vector $b \leq 2$. We show how to separate over the core of 2-matching…
In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a…
This study proposed a model to give a full-scale simulation for the dynamics of the collaborations in the dblp dataset. It is a distributed model with the capability of simulating large hypergraphs, namely systems with heterogeneously…
The transition to 100% renewable energy requires new techniques for managing energy networks, such as dividing them into sensible subsets of prosumers called micro-grids. Doing so in an optimal manner is a difficult optimization problem, as…
Learning in games provides a powerful framework to design control policies for self-interested agents that may be coupled through their dynamics, costs, or constraints. We consider the case where the dynamics of the coupled system can be…
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic,…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
We are concerned with the stability of a coalitional game, i.e., a transferable-utility (TU) cooperative game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings.…
A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of~$2^N$ into a set~$\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions~$L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…