Related papers: Markets for Efficient Public Good Allocation with …

Dynamic, risk-based pricing can systematically exclude vulnerable consumer groups from essential resources such as health insurance and consumer credit. We show that a regulator can realign private incentives with social objectives through…

Market equilibria of matching markets offer an intuitive and fair solution for matching problems without money with agents who have preferences over the items. Such a matching market can be viewed as a variation of Fisher market, albeit…

Market power exercise in the electricity markets distorts market prices and diminishes social welfare. Many markets have implemented market power mitigation processes to eliminate the impact of such behavior. The design of mitigation…

We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…

We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do…

Personalized pricing is a business strategy to charge different prices to individual consumers based on their characteristics and behaviors. It has become common practice in many industries nowadays due to the availability of a growing…

This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…

Wireless networks are evolving from radio resource providers to complex systems that also involve computing, with the latter being distributed across edge and cloud facilities. Also, their optimization is shifting more and more from a…

We study revenue maximization in a buyer-seller setting where the seller has a single object and the buyer has both a private valuation and a private budget. Private budgets complicate the classic single-product monopoly problem, making…

This study examines the mechanism design problem for public goods provision in a large economy with $n$ independent agents. We propose a class of dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms, which we…

We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades under budget constraints in a prediction market with a cost-function-based automated market maker. We study how the budget constraints of individual traders affect their ability to…

Market makers provide liquidity to other market participants: they propose prices at which they stand ready to buy and sell a wide variety of assets. They face a complex optimization problem with both static and dynamic components. They…

Optimal allocation of agricultural water in the event of droughts is an important global problem. In addressing this problem, many aspects, including the welfare of farmers, the economy, and the environment, must be considered. Under this…

Public sector agencies perform the critical task of implementing the redistributive role of the State by acting as the leading provider of critical public services that many rely on. In recent years, public agencies have been increasingly…

We develop an axiomatic theory for Automated Market Makers (AMMs) in local energy sharing markets and analyze the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the resulting economy with a Mean-Field Game. In this game, heterogeneous prosumers solve a…

We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…

Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…

This paper shows that in suitable markets, even with out-of-equilibrium trade allowed, a simple price update rule leads to rapid convergence toward the equilibrium. In particular, this paper considers a Fisher market repeated over an…

Lindahl equilibrium is a solution concept for allocating a fixed budget across several divisible public goods. It always lies in the weak core, meaning that the equilibrium allocation satisfies desirable stability and proportional fairness…

Computing market equilibria is a problem of both theoretical and applied interest. Much research to date focuses on the case of static Fisher markets with full information on buyers' utility functions and item supplies. Motivated by…