Related papers: Applying the Nash Bargaining Solution for a Reason…
We study the fair and truthful allocation of m divisible public items among n agents, each with distinct preferences for the items. To aggregate agents' preferences fairly, we focus on finding a core solution. For divisible items, a core…
Under the assumption of complete rationality, Nash equilibrium is the only reasonable strategy (set) of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. In fact, some strategies only slightly deviate from the so-called rationality, and the…
Estimating causal effects from observational data is a central problem in many domains. A general approach is to balance covariates with weights such that the distribution of the data mimics randomization. We present generalized balancing…
In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks.…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…
This paper studies convex Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) that are given by polynomials. We use rational and parametric expressions for Lagrange multipliers to formulate efficient polynomial optimization for computing…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
In a legal dispute, parties engage in a series of negotiations so as to arrive at a reasonable settlement. The parties need to present a fair and reasonable bargain in order to induce the WTA, willingness to accept of the plaintiff and the…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
One powerful technique to solve NP-hard optimization problems in practice is branch-and-reduce search---which is branch-and-bound that intermixes branching with reductions to decrease the input size. While this technique is known to be very…
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…
A fair gambling is hard to be made between two spatially separated parties without introducing a trusted third party. Here we propose a novel gambling protocol, which enables fair gambling between two distant parties without the help of a…
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games to model resource allocation by different users. As computing an exact or even an approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS-complete, Caragiannis et al. (2011) present a…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
We propose a multi-agent variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem, in which there are $N$ agents and $K$ arms, and pulling an arm generates a (possibly different) stochastic reward for each agent. Unlike the classical multi-armed…
We present a new algorithm for computing pure-strategy $\varepsilon$-Bayes-Nash equilibria ($\varepsilon$-BNEs) in combinatorial auctions with continuous value and action spaces. An essential innovation of our algorithm is to separate the…
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…
We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents communicate only with…
The generalized Nash equilibrium problems play a significant role in modeling and analyzing several complex economics problems. In this work, we consider jointly convex generalized Nash games which were introduced by Rosen. We study two…