Related papers: Model-based Randomness Monitor for Stealthy Sensor…

In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…

Watermarking can detect sensor attacks in control systems by injecting a private signal into the control, whereby attacks are identified by checking the statistics of the sensor measurements and private signal. However, past approaches…

This article introduces an anomaly detection based algorithm (AD-CPS) to detect false data injection attacks that fall under the category of data deception/integrity attacks, but with arbitrary information structure, in cyber-physical…

As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…

Stealth attacks pose potential risks to cyber-physical systems because they are difficult to detect. Assessing the risk of systems under stealth attacks remains an open challenge, especially in nonlinear systems. To comprehensively quantify…

This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of…

The threats faced by cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in critical infrastructure have motivated research into a multitude of attack detection mechanisms, including anomaly detectors based on neural network models. The effectiveness of anomaly…

Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…

The state estimation of continuous-time nonlinear systems in which a subset of sensor outputs can be maliciously controlled through injecting a potentially unbounded additive signal is considered in this paper. Analogous to our earlier work…

In this paper, we study the impact of stealthy attacks on the Cyber-Physical System (CPS) modeled as a stochastic linear system. An attack is characterised by a malicious injection into the system through input, output or both, and it is…

We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…

Designing resilient control strategies for mitigating stealthy attacks is a crucial task in emerging cyber-physical systems. In the design of anomaly detectors, it is common to assume Gaussian noise models to maintain tractability; however,…

Over the past decade, industrial control systems have experienced a massive integration with information technologies. Industrial networks have undergone numerous technical transformations to protect operational and production processes,…

Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) in modern real-time applications integrate numerous control units linked through communication networks, each responsible for executing a mix of real-time safety-critical and non-critical tasks. To ensure…

Attack detection and mitigation strategies for cyberphysical systems (CPS) are an active area of research, and researchers have developed a variety of attack-detection tools such as dynamic watermarking. However, such methods often make…

In this paper, we consider the problem of attack identification in cyber-physical systems (CPS). Attack identification is often critical for the recovery and performance of a CPS that is targeted by malicious entities, allowing defenders to…

This paper addresses the problem of distributed resilient state estimation and control for linear time-invariant systems in the presence of malicious false data injection sensor attacks and bounded noise. We consider a system operator…

This article studies a fundamental problem of security of cyber-physical systems (CPSs): that of detecting, almost surely, the presence of malicious components in the CPS. We assume that some of the actuators may be malicious while all…

Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network…

We address the problem of attack detection and attack correction for multi-output discrete-time linear time-invariant systems under sensor attack. More specifically, we focus on the situation where adversarial attack signals are added to…