Related papers: Information Design for Congested Social Services: …

How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying the application of monetary tolls to influence behavior…

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of…

Traffic congestion has large economic and social costs. The introduction of autonomous vehicles can potentially reduce this congestion by increasing road capacity via vehicle platooning and by creating an avenue for influencing people's…

Today mobile users are intensively interconnected thanks to the emerging mobile social networks, where they share location-based information with each other when traveling on different routes and visit different areas of the city. In our…

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with…

We aim to reduce the social cost of congestion in many smart city applications. In our model of congestion, agents interact over limited resources after receiving signals from a central agent that observes the state of congestion in real…

Designing secure information infrastructure is a function of design and usability. However, security is seldom given priority when systems are being developed. Secure design practices should balance between functionality (i.e., proper…

Traffic navigation services have gained widespread adoption in recent years. The route recommendations generated by these services often leads to severe congestion on urban streets, raising concerns from neighboring residents and city…

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…

To leverage prediction models to make optimal scheduling decisions in service systems, we must understand how predictive errors impact congestion due to externalities on the delay of other jobs. Motivated by applications where prediction…

We study a game of strategic information design between a sender, who chooses state-dependent information structures, a mediator who can then garble the signals generated from these structures, and a receiver who takes an action after…

Boundedly Rational User Equilibria (BRUE) capture situations where all agents on a transportation network are electing the fastest option up to some time indifference, and serve as a relaxation of User Equilibria (UE), where each agent…

We develop a versatile methodology for multidimensional mechanism design that incorporates side information about agents to generate high welfare and high revenue simultaneously. Side information sources include advice from domain experts,…

The study of influence maximization in social networks has largely ignored disparate effects these algorithms might have on the individuals contained in the social network. Individuals may place a high value on receiving information, e.g.…

The efficient use of available resources is a key factor in achieving success on both personal and organizational levels. One of the crucial resources in knowledge economy is time. The ability to force others to adapt to our schedule even…

Growth in leisure travel has become increasingly significant economically, socially, and environmentally. However, flexible but uncoordinated travel behaviors exacerbate traffic congestion. Mobile phone records not only reveal human…

We study an information design problem for a non-atomic service scheduling game. The service starts at a random time and there is a continuum of agent population who have a prior belief about the service start time but do not observe the…

We study the effects of data sharing between firms on prices, profits, and consumer welfare. Although indiscriminate sharing of consumer data decreases firm profits due to the subsequent increase in competition, selective sharing can be…

We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state…

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices…