Related papers: Fault Tolerant Equilibria in Anonymous Games: best…
We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…
Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…
This paper analyses two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping on a class of linear regular diffusions with not non-singular boundary behaviour (in the sense of It\^o and McKean (1974), p.\ 108). We provide sufficient conditions under…
Fictitious play (FP) is a history-based strategy to choose actions in normal-form games, where players best-respond to the empirical frequency of their opponents' past actions. While it is well-established that FP converges to the set of…
In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
In a society of completely selfish individuals where everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, does any equilibrium exist for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
We study a very general class of games --- multi-dimensional aggregative games --- which in particular generalize both anonymous games and weighted congestion games. For any such game that is also large, we solve the equilibrium selection…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…
This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…
Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a…
This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…