Related papers: Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with…

This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users over a Gaussian interference channel using game theory. The usual information theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection.…

This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…

We consider the existence and computational complexity of coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts represent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent approach termed partition equilibrium. We…

We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…

In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…

We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

The interference channel is the simplest communication scenario where multiple autonomous users compete for shared resources. We combine game theory and information theory to define a notion of a Nash equilibrium region of the interference…

This study investigates differential games with motion-payoff uncertainty in continuous-time settings. We propose a framework where players update their beliefs about uncertain parameters using continuous Bayesian updating. Theoretical…

Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…

We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria…

In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash…

In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In…

We prove an $N^{2-o(1)}$ lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of finding an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium (for constant $\epsilon>0$) in a two-player $N\times N$ game.

LLM agents are known to deviate from Nash equilibria in strategic interactions, but nobody has looked inside the model to understand why, or asked whether the deviation can be reversed. We do both. Working with four open-source models…

When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides…

The notion of fault tolerant Nash equilibria has been introduced as a way of studying the robustness of Nash equilibria. Under this notion, a fixed number of players are allowed to exhibit faulty behavior in which they may deviate…

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distinct nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the receiver is thus indirect. We ask when it is possible to robustly implement the…

We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…