Related papers: High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation Using Parametric…
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible chores under additive valuations. We assume that the chores are divided into two types and under this scenario, we present several results. Our first result is a new characterization…
We initiate the study of multi-layered cake cutting with the goal of fairly allocating multiple divisible resources (layers of a cake) among a set of agents. The key requirement is that each agent can only utilize a single resource at each…
We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this…
We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset $\mathcal{M}$ of $t$ types of indivisible items among $d$ groups of agents, where all agents within a group have identical additive valuations. Gorantla et al. [GMV23] showed…
The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indivisible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
With very few exceptions, recent research in fair division has mostly focused on deterministic allocations. Deviating from this trend, we study the fairness notion of interim envy-freeness (iEF) for lotteries over allocations, which serves…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
When modeling an application of practical relevance as an instance of a combinatorial problem X, we are often interested not merely in finding one optimal solution for that instance, but in finding a sufficiently diverse collection of good…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical, additive valuations but individual budget constraints. Here, the indivisible goods--each with a specific size and value--need to be allocated such that the…
The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job…
We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible goods to agents with additive valuations using the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and equitability up to one good (EQ1) in…
We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible chores to agents with additive cost functions. We consider the popular fairness notion of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) with the efficiency notion of…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents in an online setting, where goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. Focusing on the popular fairness notions of envy-freeness, proportionality, and…
The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guaranteed to exist. Classical works have avoided this issue by…
We consider the problem of dividing limited resources between a set of agents arriving sequentially with unknown (stochastic) utilities. Our goal is to find a fair allocation - one that is simultaneously Pareto-efficient and envy-free. When…
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among additive agents with feasibility constraints. In these settings, every agent is restricted to get a bundle among a specified set of feasible bundles. Such scenarios have been of great…