Related papers: Plurality in Spatial Voting Games with constant $\…
Winner selection by majority, in an election between two candidates, is the only rule compatible with democratic principles. Instead, when the candidates are three or more and the voters rank candidates in order of preference, there are no…
We conjecture that Borda count is the ranked choice voting method that best preserves the outcome of an election with randomly corrupted votes, among all fair voting methods with small influences satisfying the Condorcet Loser Criterion.…
In the planar one-round discrete Voronoi game, two players $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ compete over a set $V$ of $n$ voters represented by points in $\mathbb{R}^2$. First, $\mathcal{P}$ places a set $P$ of $k$ points, then $\mathcal{Q}$…
In the traditional voting manipulation literature, it is assumed that a group of manipulators jointly misrepresent their preferences to get a certain candidate elected, while the remaining voters are truthful. In this paper, we depart from…
We present a unifying framework encompassing many social choice settings. Viewing each social choice setting as voting in a suitable metric space, we consider a general model of social choice over metric spaces, in which---similarly to the…
The noise stability of a Euclidean set $A$ with correlation $\rho$ is the probability that $(X,Y)\in A\times A$, where $X,Y$ are standard Gaussian random vectors with correlation $\rho\in(0,1)$. It is well-known that a Euclidean set of…
The well-known Condorcet's Jury theorem posits that the majority rule selects the best alternative among two available options with probability one, as the population size increases to infinity. We study this result under an asymmetric…
Pull voting is a classic method to reach consensus among $n$ vertices with differing opinions in a distributed network: each vertex at each step takes on the opinion of a random neighbour. This method, however, suffers from two drawbacks.…
Let $V$ be a multiset of $n$ points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, which we call voters, and let $k\geq 1$ and $\ell\geq 1$ be two given constants. We consider the following game, where two players $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ compete over the…
In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters agree on even a single…
We consider spatial voting where candidates are located in the Euclidean $d$-dimensional space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their distance from the voter's ideal point. We explore the case where information about the location…
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should…
Consider $2k-1$ voters, each of which has a preference ranking between $n$ given alternatives. An alternative $A$ is called a Condorcet winner, if it wins against every other alternative $B$ in majority voting (meaning that for every other…
We study strategic candidate positioning in multidimensional spatial-voting elections. Voters and candidates are represented as points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, and each voter supports the candidate that is closest under a distance induced by an…
We study a mathematical model of voting contest with $m$ voters and $n$ candidates, with each voter ranking the candidates in order of preference, without ties. A Condorcet winner is a candidate who gets more than $m/2$ votes in pairwise…
Condorcet's paradox is a fundamental result in social choice theory which states that there exist elections in which, no matter which candidate wins, a majority of voters prefer a different candidate. In fact, even if we can select any $k$…
We consider elections where both voters and candidates can be associated with points in a metric space and voters prefer candidates that are closer to those that are farther away. It is often assumed that the optimal candidate is the one…
Distributed voting is a fundamental topic in distributed computing. In pull voting, in each step every vertex chooses a neighbour uniformly at random, and adopts its opinion. The voting is completed when all vertices hold the same opinion.…
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…
Given a finite set $K$, we denote by $X=\Delta(K)$ the set of probabilities on $K$ and by $Z=\Delta_f(X)$ the set of Borel probabilities on $X$ with finite support. Studying a Markov Decision Process with partial information on $K$…