Related papers: Dispute Resolution in Voting
We propose an exactly solvable model for the dynamics of voters in a two-party system. The opinion formation process is modeled on a random network of agents. The dynamical nature of interpersonal relations is also reflected in the model,…
The strongest threat model for voting systems considers coercion resistance: protection against coercers that force voters to modify their votes, or to abstain. Existing remote voting systems either do not provide this property; require an…
The adaptive voter model is a paradigmatic model in the study of opinion formation. Here we propose an extension for this model, in which conflicts are resolved by obtaining another opinion, and analytically study the time required for…
We consider the classic veto bargaining model but allow the agenda setter to engage in persuasion to convince the veto player to approve her proposal. We fully characterize the optimal proposal and experiment when Vetoer has quadratic loss,…
Coercion resistance is an important and one of the most intricate security requirements of electronic voting protocols. Several definitions of coercion resistance have been proposed in the literature, including definitions based on symbolic…
Overseas military personnel often face significant challenges in participating in elections due to the slow pace of traditional mail systems, which can result in ballots missing crucial deadlines. While internet-based voting offers a faster…
Bribery in an election is one of the well-studied control problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we propose and study the safe bribery problem. Here the goal of the briber is to ask the bribed voters to vote in such a way…
We consider the Conflict Resolution Problem in the context of a multiple-access system in which several stations can transmit their messages simultaneously to the channel. We assume that there are n stations and that at most k<= n stations…
In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…
The design of fair voting rules has been addressed quite often in the literature. Still, the so-called inverse problem is not entirely resolved. We summarize some achievements in this direction and formulate explicit open questions and…
Metric distortion in social choice is a framework for evaluating how well voting rules minimize social cost when both voters and candidates exist in a shared metric space, with a voter's cost defined by their distance to a candidate. Voters…
In a multi-agent system, one may choose to govern the behaviour of an agent by imposing norms, which act as guidelines for how agents should act either all of the time or in given situations. However, imposing multiple norms on one or more…
A proposer requires the approval of a veto player to change a status quo. Preferences are single peaked. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's ideal point. We study Proposer's optimal mechanism without transfers. Vetoer is given a menu, or a…
Arguments are essential objects in DirectDemocracyP2P, where they can occur both in association with signatures for petitions, or in association with other debated decisions, such as bug sorting by importance. The arguments of a signer on a…
Perpetual voting addresses fairness in sequential collective decision-making by evaluating representational equity over time. However, existing perpetual voting rules rely on full participation and complete approval information, assumptions…
Perpetual voting was recently introduced as a framework for long-term collective decision making. In this framework, we consider a sequence of subsequent approval-based elections and try to achieve a fair overall outcome. To achieve…
In this paper we address the problem of recovery from failures without re-running entire elections when elections fail to verify. We consider the setting of \emph{dual voting} protocols, where the cryptographic guarantees of end-to-end…
Preference elicitation is a central problem in AI, and has received significant attention in single-agent settings. It is also a key problem in multiagent systems, but has received little attention here so far. In this setting, the agents…
When making simultaneous decisions, our preference for the outcomes on one subset can depend on the outcomes on a disjoint subset. In referendum elections, this gives rise to the separability problem, where a voter must predict the outcome…
Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look…