Related papers: Heterogeneous Facility Location Games
In Facility Location problems there are agents that should be connected to facilities and locations where facilities may be opened so that agents can connect to them. We depart from Uncapacitated Facility Location and by assuming that the…
Facility location games provide an abstract model of mechanism design. In such games, a mechanism takes a profile of $n$ single-peaked preferences over an interval as an input and determines the location of a facility on the interval. In…
Large-scale heterogeneous multiagent systems feature various realistic factors in the real world, such as agents with diverse abilities and overall system cost. In comparison to homogeneous systems, heterogeneous systems offer significant…
When selecting locations for a set of facilities, standard clustering algorithms may place unfair burden on some individuals and neighborhoods. We formulate a fairness concept that takes local population densities into account. In…
In this paper, we study a variant of hedonic games, called \textsc{Seat Arrangement}. The model is defined by a bijection from agents with preferences for each other to vertices in a graph $G$. The utility of an agent depends on the…
Hedonic games are fundamental models for investigating the formation of coalitions among a set of strategic agents, where every agent has a certain utility for every possible coalition of agents it can be part of. To avoid the…
As a schematic model of the complexity economic agents are confronted with, we introduce the ``SK-game'', a discrete time binary choice model inspired from mean-field spin-glasses. We show that even in a completely static environment,…
We study Facility Location with Matching, a Facility Location problem where, given additional information about which pair of clients is compatible to be matched, we need to match as many clients as possible and assign each matched client…
Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…
We define and analyze a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in which decision-making agents can observe the choices and rewards of their neighbors. Neighbors are defined by a network graph with heterogeneous and stochastic…
We first show that a better analysis of the algorithm for The Two-Sage Stochastic Facility Location Problem from Srinivasan \cite{sri07} and the algorithm for The Robust Fault Tolerant Facility Location Problem from Byrka et al \cite{bgs10}…
Facility Location problems ask to place facilities in a way that optimizes a given objective function so as to provide a service to all clients. These are one of the most well-studied optimization problems spanning many research areas such…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…
Artificial intelligence and robotic competitions are accompanied by a class of game paradigms in which each player privately commits a strategy to a game system which simulates the game using the collected joint strategy and then returns…
In this paper we formulate the homogeneous two- and three-dimensional self-reconfiguration problem over discrete grids as a constrained potential game. We develop a game-theoretic learning algorithm based on the Metropolis-Hastings…
Many allocation problems in multiagent systems rely on agents specifying cardinal preferences. However, allocation mechanisms can be sensitive to small perturbations in cardinal preferences, thus causing agents who make ``small" or…
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where $n$ selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed by a non-negative weight per agent). Agents using the…
In this paper, we study non-obvious manipulability (NOM), a relaxed form of strategyproofness, in the context of Hedonic Games (HGs) with Friends Appreciation (FA) preferences. In HGs, the aim is to partition agents into coalitions…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
Demand outstrips available resources in most situations, which gives rise to competition, interaction and learning. In this article, we review a broad spectrum of multi-agent models of competition (El Farol Bar problem, Minority Game,…