Related papers: When Votes Change and Committees Should (Not)
The voter model is a simple agent-based model to mimic opinion dynamics in social networks: a randomly chosen agent adopts the opinion of a randomly chosen neighbour. This process is repeated until a consensus emerges. Although the basic…
Consider the voter model on a box of side length $L$ (in the triangular lattice) with boundary votes fixed forever as type 0 or type 1 on two different halves of the boundary. Motivated by analogous questions in percolation, we study…
We study the {PAC} learnability of multiwinner voting, focusing on the class of approval-based committee scoring (ABCS) rules. These are voting rules applied on profiles with approval ballots, where each voter approves some of the…
The winner determination problems of many attractive multi-winner voting rules are NP-complete. However, they often admit polynomial-time algorithms when restricting inputs to be single-peaked. Commonly, such algorithms employ dynamic…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
Voter control problems model situations in which an external agent tries toaffect the result of an election by adding or deleting the fewest number of voters. The goal of the agent is to make a specific candidate either win…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively,…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
In this paper, we discuss a voting model with two candidates, C_0 and C_1. We consider two types of voters--herders and independents. The voting of independents is based on their fundamental values; on the other hand, the voting of herders…
In this work we study the majority-vote model with the presence of two distinc noises. The first one is the usual noise $q$, that represents the probability that a given agent follows the minority opinion of his/her social contacts. On the…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
We introduce and study the block voter model with noise on two-dimensional square lattices using Monte Carlo simulations and finite-size scaling techniques. The model is defined by an outflow dynamics where a central set of $N_{PCS}$ spins,…
We consider multiwinner elections in Euclidean space using the minimax Chamberlin-Courant rule. In this setting, voters and candidates are embedded in a $d$-dimensional Euclidean space, and the goal is to choose a committee of $k$…
We introduce time variation in the flip-rates of the Voter Model. This type of generalisation is relevant to models of ageing in language change, allowing the representation of changes in speakers' learning rates over their lifetime and may…
Inspired by applications in testing for Covid-19, we consider a variant of two-stage group testing called "conservative" (or "trivial") two-stage testing, where every item declared to be defective must be definitively confirmed by being…
For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study empirically…
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where…
This paper considers elections in which voters choose one candidate each, independently according to known probability distributions. A candidate receiving a strict majority (absolute or relative, depending on the version) wins. After the…
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…