Related papers: Discrete-time mean field games with risk averse-ag…
This paper develops a linear programming approach for mean field games with reflected jump-diffusion dynamics. We first prove the equivalence between the mean field equilibria in the linear programming formulation and those in the weak…
Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time to a multi-agent scheme…
In this paper, we use mean field games (MFGs) to investigate approximations of $N$-player games with uniformly symmetrically continuous heterogeneous closed-loop actions. To incorporate agents' risk aversion (beyond the classical expected…
We use the recently developed probabilistic analysis of mean field games with finitely many states in the weak formulation, to set-up a principal / agent contract theory model where the principal faces a large population of agents…
A discrete time stochastic model for a multiagent system given in terms of a large collection of interacting Markov chains is studied. The evolution of the interacting particles is described through a time inhomogeneous transition…
We present a framework that incorporates the idea of bounded rationality into dynamic stochastic pursuit-evasion games. The solution of a stochastic game is characterized, in general, by its (Nash) equilibria in feedback form. However,…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
Multi-agent games in dynamic nonlinear settings are challenging due to the time-varying interactions among the agents and the non-stationarity of the (potential) Nash equilibria. In this paper we consider model-free games, where agent…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
In this paper we study mean field games with possibly multiple mean field equilibria. Instead of focusing on the individual equilibria, we propose to study the set of values over all possible equilibria, which we call the set value of the…
This paper considers risk-averse learning in convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their individual risk of incurring significantly high costs. Specifically, the agents adopt the conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a…
We consider a market impact game for $n$ risk-averse agents that are competing in a market model with linear transient price impact and additional transaction costs. For both finite and infinite time horizons, the agents aim to minimize a…
Mean field games formalize dynamic games with a continuum of players and explicit interaction where the players can have heterogeneous states. As they additionally yield approximate equilibria of corresponding $N$-player games, they are of…
This paper considers a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion where agents want to leave a given bounded domain through a part of its boundary in minimal time. Each agent is free to move in any direction, but their maximal speed is…
We study in this paper three aspects of Mean Field Games. The first one is the case when the dynamics of each player depend on the strategies of the other players. The second one concerns the modeling of '' noise '' in discrete space models…
Model predictive control strategies require to solve in an sequential manner, many, possibly non-convex, optimization problems. In this work, we propose an interacting stochastic agent system to solve those problems. The agents evolve in…
This paper develops a predictive compensation framework for finite-horizon, discrete-time linear quadratic dynamic games subject to Gauss-Markov execution deviations from feedback Nash strategies. One player's control is corrupted by…
In a probabilistic mean field game driven by a L\'evy process an individual player aims to minimize a long run discounted/ergodic cost by controlling the process through a pair of increasing and decreasing c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…
In this study, we investigate $N$-player stochastic differential games with regime switching, where the player dynamics are modulated by a finite-state Markov chain. We analyze the associated Nash system, which consists of a system of…
In this paper we consider long-run risk sensitive average cost impulse control applied to a continuous-time Feller-Markov process. Using the probabilistic approach, we show how to get a solution to a suitable continuous-time Bellman…